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WHERE A TAX DISADVANTAGE LOOMS
LARGE: INTEREST EXPENSE AND
THE AMERICAN CORPORATE
RETURN TO SOUTH AFRICA
Given the breadth of its changes, the Tax Reform Act of
1986 ("TRA 1986")' marks a historic juncture in United States
corporate taxation2 as it significantly altered the decisional
calculus for investments in areas as diverse as U.S. real estate3
and international business.4 In terms of the latter, nowhere is
the magnitude of its impact clearer than in the management of
interest expense5 within multinational corporations ("NCs").6
As a result of TRA 1986, interest expense of all U.S. companies
within a U.S. MNC is now dispersed across all of the group's
income sources, foreign and domestic, irrespective of where loan
proceeds are expended. In placing portions of such interest
against foreignsource income, 7 the new interest expense rules
in effect 'dilute'8 the role the foreign tax credit election has in
1 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99514, 100 Stat. 2085 (22 October
1986).
2 See Alan Murray, Historic Act: Unparalleled Tax Bill Will Affect Everyone
And Restore Corporate Levies to '70s, Wall St. J., A Special Issue on the Tax Act of
1986, August 18, 1986, at 1 (1986).
3 See Julia K. Brazelton, Tax Reform of 1986: Evaluating Investments in Res-
idential Real Estate, 66 Taxes 158 (1988); see generally A. ARNOLD, REAL ES-
TATE INVESTMENTS AFTER THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, (1987).
4 See Douglas R. Sease & Thomas Kamm, Tax Bill May Force New Practices
Abroad, Wall St. J., A Special Issue on the Tax Act of 1986, August 18, 1986, at 30
(1986).
5 See note and accompanying text, infra.
6 As it will be used here, the term "multinational corporation" denotes a
group of corporations which are "privately owned and managed in one country" as
opposed to transnational corporations which are "owned and managed by nationals
in different countries." JOHN D. DANIELS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSI-
NESS: ENVIRONMENTS AND OPERATIONS, 9 (3rd ed. 1982Xhereinafter
"Daniels").
7 See Keith F. Sellers & Deborah W. Thomas, The Interest Allocation Rules
for Foreign and Domestic Income, 1 J. Intl Tax'n 152 (1990Xhereinafter "Sellers
and Thomas").
8 H. Onno Ruding, U.S. Tax Policy is Hurting U.S. Multinationals operating
in the EC, 5 J. Int'l Tax'n 4 (1994).
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reducing the worldwide tax burden of U.S. MNCs.9 And inas-
much as MNCs from other industrialized countries operate
under less onerous deduction rules, the interest expense re-
forms arising from TRA 1986 render American MNCs less com-
petitive in both domestic and international markets. 10
This Comment examines this global tax disadvantage in
the context of U.S. corporations returning to South Africa, a
country which recently concluded its first nonracial democratic
elections. No longer burdened by international economic sanc-
tions," contemporary South Africa provides a unique landscape
in which to view the deleterious effects the new interest expense
rules have on corporate investment decisions. Specifically, it is
argued that the incongruity between the primary U.S. tax plan-
ning goals that have emerged since TRA 1986 and current
South African investment regulations may actually inhibit the
return of U.S. manufacturing MNCs to South Africa. 12
Three parts organize this Comment. The first part outlines
the overall climate for foreign investment in South Africa and
reviews the basic elements that comprise the market strategies
of manufacturing MNCs. Part II examines the Internal Reve-
nue Code (I.R.C.)' 3 provisions and Treasury Regulations (Treas.
Reg.) pertaining to interest expense allocations within multina-
tional corporate groups, notes the overall impact these rules
have had on U.S. manufacturing MNCs and briefly looks at the
interest expense provisions employed in the British, German
and Japanese tax systems. Part III discuss how the scope of
U.S. economic sanctions, corporate divestitures patterns, and
current exchange control and tax regulations in South Africa
9 U.S. tax provisions pertaining to foreign tax credits are discussed in Part I,
infra.
10 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION ON TAXATION, COM-
MENTS ON THE IMPAIRMENT OF THE ABILITY OF U.S.BASED MULTINA-
TIONAL COMPANIES TO COMPETE IN THE UNITED STATES RESULTING
FROM THE INTERESTEXPENSE ALLOCATION PROVISIONS, 7 (1991).
11 An overview of sanctions applied by the U.S. and others is provided in Part
III, infra.
12 For an argument that sees the new interest expense rules as part of several
recent changes in U.S. tax law which render multinational corporations less com-
petitive globally, see James Leonard, Note, The AntiCompetitive Effect of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of United Statesbased Multinational Corporations, 20 Denv. J.
Int'l L. & Pory 493, 497501 (1992)(hereinafter 'Leonard7).
13 All sections cited herein refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended.
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magnify this tax disadvantage. This Comment concludes that
joint ventures structured as foreign partnerships provide the
most tax efficient vehicle for U.S. manufacturing MNCs to use
in reinvesting in the South African marketplace.
PART I. INDEPENDENT SOUTH AFRICA AND MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATE STRATEGY
After decades of internal struggle for liberation and ten
years of international economic sanctions, South Africa con-
ducted its first national, nonracial democratic elections during
the last week of April 1994.14 Two weeks later, Nelson
Mandela, the leader of the African National Congress ("ANC"),
became the first President of a democratic Republic of South Af-
rica, at once burying apartheid while ushering in a new era of
hope and prosperity. 15 No longer the "international pariah" it
had become during the sanctions era, South Africa is now
poised for a substantial inflow of foreign investment.16 In fact,
over $20 billion in foreign direct investment may flow into
South Africa over the next few years.' 7 The following section
outlines the broad forces which may propel South Africa into an
era of rapid economic growth.
A. Investment opportunities in South Africa, circa 1994
South Africa is considered a uppermiddleincome developing
country,' having reached that level of economic development
through the invidious apartheid system' 9 which preserved ex-
14 Bill Keller, Mandela Picks Old Comrades To Fill His New Government,
N.Y. Times, May 7, 1994 at 1.
15 Keller, Mandela Is Named President, Closing the Era of Apartheid, N.Y.
Times, May 10, 1994, at Al.
16 Investing in South Africa: U.S. Companies Warily Eye South Africa, Wall
St. J., Oct. 7, 1993, at A2(hereinafter "Investing in South Africa").
17 Richard Thomson, A miracle waiting to happen, The Independent, July 1,
1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MDEAFR File.
18 WORLD BANK, THE WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994, 165
(1994).
19 Through the codification of an array of discriminatory labor, travel and
housing practices, the principle of separate development called apartheid in
Afrikans became an elaborate system of institutionalized racism, one that system-
atically disenfranchised nonwhites from exercising meaningful political and social
control over their lives. For a legal history of this system, see Frank Berman,
South Africa: A Study of Apartheid Law and Its Enforcement, 2 Touro J. Transnatl
T~aT& DInaVANATAGE
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ceptional living standards for its white citizenry while impover-
ishing and politically disenfranchising the vast majority of
black South Africans.20 Under apartheid, the South African
economy developed a dual structure, with its Gross Domestic
Product of roughly $110 billion2 ' drawing heavily upon world
prices for several highvalued mineral exports, namely gold,
diamonds, coal, and strategic minerals. 22 While a well-
developed commercial infrastructure, an established financial
services sector and expansive consumer markets evidence its in-
dustrial development,23 illiteracy, inadequate housing, malnu-
trition and a monstrous high unemployment rate among South
Africa's black citizenry of 29 million remain salient features of
South Africa's century of institutionalized racism.24 Hence sev-
eral large parastatals 25 and mining conglomerates 26 dominate a
modern industrial sector whereas a fragmented informal sector
continues to generates about 40% of all economic activity inside
South Africa.27
L. 1 (1991). See generally JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH
AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER (1978).
20 See generally FRANCIS WILSON & MAMPHELE RAMPLEL, UP-
ROOTING POVERTY: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CHALLENGE, (1989).
21 Europa, Africa South of the Sahara 1994: South Africa, 806 (23rd ed.,
1994)(hereinafter "Africa South of the Sahara").
22 Strategic minerals include uranium, platinum, chromite vanadium, tita-
nium, and manganese. See generally E.W. ANDERSON & G. H. BLAKE, THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AS A SUPPLIER OF STRATEGIC MINERALS,
(1984).
23 Investing in South Africa, supra note 16, at A2.
24 Marshall Loeb, Returning to South Africa, Fortune, Oct. 4, 1993, at 18.
25 Among the largest parastatals, until their recent privatizations, were the
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), Electric Services Commission (ES-
COM), and the Iron and Steel Corporation of South Africa (ISCOR). For a histori-
cal look at the establishment of these and other parastatals, see generally H.B.
FALKENA, THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE AND ITS ENTREPRENEURS,
(1980).
26 See generally DUNCAN INNES, ANGLOAMERICAN AND THE RISE OF
MODERN SOUTH AFRICA, (1984); see also GEOFFREY WHEATCROFT, THE
RANDLORDS, THE MEN WHO MADE SOUTH AFRICA, (1985); and HEDLEY
CHILVERS, THE STORY OF DEBEERS, (1939).
27 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ECONOMIC POLICIES FOR A
NEW SOUTH AFRICA, (Desmond Lachman & Kenneth Bercuson, eds.,
1993Xhereinafter "Lachman & Bercuson").
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For multinational corporations, a key question is whether
South Africa's highly charged politics,28 organized in part by
Zulu nationalism in the Natal region, 29 will maintain a degree
of political risk that will prevent MNCs from returning there.30
Lingering concerns about the rights of foreign investors to repa-
triate profits31 and the ANC government's proposed changes in
wealth taxation 32 continue to dampen investor confidence. To
some analysts, the country's overall economic growth potential
is limited, as the economy is said to be plagued by 'weak domes-
tic demand, inability of penetrate international markets, rising
operational costs and loss of consumer and business confi-
dence.'33 Additionally, most U.S. manufacturing INCs do not
see South Africa as a 'major sourcing point' for global exports. 34
In fact, South Africa "ranks only 30th among U.S. world export
markets."35
Nevertheless, U.S.South Africa trade has steadily in-
creased since the partial repeal of U.S. sanctions in 1991, with
the U.S. becoming South Africa's largest trading partner two
28 The Inkatha Freedom Party, the Zulu nationalist party, at first refused to
participate in the Transitional Executive Council ("TEC") and the general election,
in part because the TEC failed to consider the establishment of a separate Zulu
state in the Natal region. At the end of 1993, some observers feared Inthaka would,
through nonparticipation in the election and demands for an independent state,
send the entire reform process into a spiral of uncontrollable violence. Canada sup-
ports first multiracial elections in South Africa by contribution to $2.5 million,
Canada Newswire Dec. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Business File.
29 Patti Waldmeir, Hopes of glory, fears of blood, Fin. Times, Jan. 1, 1994, at
7.
30 Before and after the Transitional Executive Council assumed the reigns of
government in December 1993, several violent clashes between rival political par-
ties placed the April elections in jeopardy, causing a few foreign corporations to
dissolve their investments For example, a German consortium, citing the country's
uncertain future, sold its South African holdings in late 1993. South Africa:
Germans pull out of Martin Jonker, Bus. Day, Dec. 1, 1993, at 8.
31 Mandela has maintained, since his release in February 1990, that the
ANC's previous calls for nationalization of industries were outdated. See Southern
Africa Monitor, Afr. Econ. Dig. May 28, 1990, at 3.
32 ANC denies that wealth levy scheme is policy, S. Afr. Rev., Nov. 1991, at 6.
33 Econ. Intelligence Unit, Country report: South Africa 29 (lst, 1994).
34 Bill Keller, In Mandela's South Africa, Foreign Investors are Few, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 3, 1994, at Al.
35 Market Reports, South Africa Overseas Business Report, June 16, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BUSANL File.
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years later.36 In fact, American goods comprised 14% of South
Africa's import needs in 1992. 37 With its population of 39 mil-
lion expected to double by the year 2020 and with economic
growth projected to be 5% annually during the next decade, a
diverse range of industries, including food processing, avionics,
household appliances, and pharmaceuticals, display solid
growth potential for U.S. manufacturers.38 Indeed both white
and black consumer markets impart a distinct awareness of and
desire for American products.39
Given the large aid pledges 40 that accompanied the un-
veiling of ANC's reconstruction and redevelopment program
last December, voluminous amounts of foreign aid is expected
to flow into South Africa over the next decade.41 The U.S. has
36 Amy Kaslow, Trade with S. Africa gathers steam, Christian Sci. Monitor
June 30, 1994, at 9 (hereinafter "Kaslow").
37 Market Reports, South Africa, Sept. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, BUSANL File (hereinafter cited as "Market Reports, Sept. 15, 1993").
38 Some economists believe that the South African economy has the potential
to grow at an annual rate of more than five percent. Market Reports, South Africa:
Country Marketing Plan FY '94, Dec. 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, COMPNY
Library, BUSOPP File.
39 Id. See generally RICHARD W. HULL, AMERICAN ENTERPRISESIN
SOUTH AFRICA, 242295 (1990); see also VICTOR RAZIS, THE AMERICAN
CONNECTION: THE INFLUENCE OF UNITED STATES BUSINESS ON
SOUTH AFRICA, (1986); CHRISTOPHER COKER, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AS AN INTERNATIONAL SANCTION: THE ROLE OF U.S. CORPORATIONS
IN SOUTH AFRICA.
40 After a ten year ban, the U. S. Senate in September 1993 repealed the
Gramm Amendment which prevented South Africa from receiving any type of
assistance from International Monetary Fund ("IMF") or the World Bank and re-
stored recipient status to South Africa. Stella Dawson, Mandela urges investment
without foreign meddling, Reuter Newswire, Sept. 25, 1993, available in
WESTLAW, INTNEWS Database. The World Bank earmarked $1 billion for devel-
opment projects in education and urban infrastructure in mid1993. Rory Chan-
ning, South Africa may soon return to IMF fold, Reuter Newswire, Sept. 17, 1993,
available in WESTLAW, INTNEWS Database. Additionally, the International
Monetary Fund provided the TEC a temporary financing facility totalling $849
million in order to bolster the country's balance of payments deficit. IMF approves
$849 million loan to South Africa, first in a decade, BNA International Bus.& Fin.
Daily, Dec. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNADNEWS File.
41 At that time the ANC released a longterm assessment of the economy and
outlined the policies it would pursue if elected. Economist Intelligence Unit, Coun-
try Report: South Africa, 20 (1st, 1994); South Africa Set For Investmentled
Growth Reuter Newswire, Dec. 2, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
INTNEWS File.
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already committed $600 million to South Africa,42 with most of
this aid being tied to the procurement of U.S. products and serv-
ices. Companies providing the types of goods and services that
pertain to housing, health care and infrastructure the sectors
targeted for massive public sector investment under the ANC's
plan may secure large international contracts. 43
Also in view of the country's position of economic hegemony
in the subcontinent, South Africa's domestic markets impart a
distinct regional dimension.44 Realignment of the several re-
gional economic organizations could provide South Africa with
as much as $250 million in increased exports. 45 Since Western
MNCs have long viewed South Africa as a natural launch pad
into the markets of neighboring countries, 46 changes in the re-
gional economy will certainly increase foreign direct investment
in South Africa's manufacturing base.
Lastly, official encouragement and favorable regulatory ac-
tion in both countries continues to facilitate U.S. manufacturer
investments in South Africa. For instance, over $50 million in
political risk insurance available from the United States Over-
seas Private Investment Corporation 47 is readily available.48 A
42 Steve Holland, Clinton to Raise U.S. Aid to S. Africa to $600 Million, J.
Com., May 6, 1994, at 3A-
43 For example, due to the country's desperate need for inexpensive housing,
manufacturers of prefabricated housing may secure modest to lucrative contacts
contained in USfinanced development projects. See Paula Green, South African
Companies to Visit U.S. In Bid to Strengthen Trade Links, J. Com., June 17, 1992,
at 5A.
44 See generally JOSEPH HANLON, BEGGAR YOUR NEIGHBOURS,
(1986). Regional dependence on products manufactured in South Africa, may actu-
ally intensify if South Africa enters into a regional free trade zone with the mem-
bers of the recently reorganized Southern African Development Community. For a
concise view as to the role South Africa could have in such a scenario, see Erich
Leistner, Designing the framework for a Southern African Development Commu-
nity, 22 Afr. Insight 4 (1992).
45 Gary S. Eisenberg, The Policy and Law of Foreign Direct Investment in the
New South Africa, 28 J. World Trade 5, 25 (hereinafter "Eisenberg").
46 Gateway to a continent, Asian Bus., Mar. 1992 , at 42. In announcing its
joint venture with a South African company, Pepsi officials specifically noted that
it intended to use South Africa as a "springboard" into the region. See note 533 and
accompanying text, infra.
47 Established in 1969 the Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC")
is an executive agency that provides risk insurance and lends equity capital to
U.S. investors and companies seeking to invest in developing countries. For a dis-
cussion of its development, see Theodor Meron, Note, OPIC investment is alive and
well, 73 Am. J. Int'l L., 104 (1979).
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support network for South African investments is also growing
in the private sector, including the probable formation of a U.S.-
South Africa business council. 49 Commercial lending activity is
increasing, and a regional development bank may emerge.50
The competition for South Africa's domestic markets is ex-
pected to be fierce. 51 In fact, many European MNCs have been
reinvesting in South Africa since 1991. Although some U.S.
trade and investment bans were removed then, the remaining
sanctions continued until late 1993.52 Thus, in the search for
promising local companies in which to acquire or establish joint
ventures with, American manufacturing MNCs may already be
at a competitive disadvantage as European and Asian competi-
tors have had in effect a two year headstart.
On top of these marketborne disadvantages, U.S. MNCs
are likely to encounter higher tax costs due to the different sets
of planning considerations that arise from interest expense reg-
ulations under U.S. tax law and South African regulations of
foreign investment. Hence before delving into the significance
the interest expense rules have on the international investment
behavior of U.S. MNCs, the overall strategy and specific objec-
tives of such corporations are briefly noted.
B. Multinational Corporate Strategy
As the term suggests, multinational corporations operate in
various countries, with the parent corporation residing in the
4 Kaslow, supra note 38, at 9. In November 1993 the TEC negotiated an in-
vestment agreement with OPIC. U.S., S. Africa sign deal on investment assistance,
Reuter Newswire, Nov. 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTNEWS
File. The OPIC began meeting with South African officials and American inves-
tors interested in South Africa in May 1992. Southern Africa Monitor, Aft. Econ.
Dig., May 4, 1992, at 9. One of OPIC's programs, Africa Growth Fund, is 'privately
owned and managed by banks and other interests which invest in the fund,' with
OPIC extending risk insurance to it. President Clinton has specifically geared
OPIC as a conduit of American foreign investment in several 'strategic' markets.
U.S. Investors Abroad to Benefit from OPIC's New Rule, J. Com., Oct. 29, 1993, at
1A.
49 Richard Lawrence, U.S., S. Africa Strengthening Their Bilateral Trade
Links, J. Com., June 2, 1994, at 2A.
50 Rosalind Rachid, Mandela gets boost from U.S. business, J. Com., at 1A.
51 Mark Solomon, Return to South Africa seen Rough for U.S. firms, J. Com.,
at 4B.
52 See notes 432-461 and accompanying text, infra.
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'home' country while their foreign affiliates 53 conduct business
in 'host' countries.54 MNCs are typically conceptualized as "a
combination of companies of different nationality, connected by
means of shareholdings, managerial control or contract and
constituting an economic unit."55  Such corporations are
uniquely powerful organizations 56 as their tremendous finan-
cial resources and sophisticated operating structures provide
both economies of scale and of scope in producing, marketing
and transporting goods throughout the world. 57 In fact, in 1980
the size of the annual product of two oil MNCs, Exxon and
Royal Dutch/Shell, ranked the higher than that of South
Africa. 58
In pursuing market expansion and product diversification
on a global scale, the parent corporations of U.S. MNCs under-
take various types investments to ensure longterm financial
stability.5 9 All investments made by MNCs are products of busi-
ness strategy, with the specific goals of investment set against a
mix of financial, tax and managerial considerations. 60 While
53 For purposes of this article, the term 'affiliate' refers to companies that op-
erate in foreign jurisdictions and which a U.S. corporate shareholder owns at least
5 percent of the affiliate's voting stock. See "Affiliate company," Black's Law Dic-
tionary 58 (6th ed. 1990).
54 Except for substituting 'multinational' with 'transnational,' the homehost
dichotomy is the terminology employed by the United Nations Centre on Transna-
tional Corporations ("UNCTC"). See generally UNCTC, TRANSNATIONAL COR-
PORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT (1983).
55 CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF, SCHMITTHOFF'S EXPORT TRADE 271 (8th
ed. 1986)(hereinafter "Schmitthoff"), quoting Clive M. Schmitthoff, Nationalism
and Multinational Enterprise 24 (C. Schmitthoff ed., 1973).
56 The literature on multinational and transnational corporations is massive.
For a concise review of the various themes within this literature, see D. K
Fieldhouse, The multinational: a critique of a concept, in MULTINATIONAL EN-
TERPRISE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 929 (A- Teichova et al., eds., 1986).
57 Economies of scale enable MNCs to handle a variety of investment types
while economies of scope permit such corporations to structure single investments
that are capable of 'supporting multiple profitable activities.' ALAN C. SHAPIRO,
MULTINATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, 521-22 (3rd ed., 1989)(herein-
after "Shapiro").
58 Jacqueline Matthews, Multinational Corporations in SADCC (Southern Af-
rican Development Coordination Conference), in BANKING AND BUSINESS IN
SOUTH AFRICA 159 (S. Jones ed., 1988), citing WORLD BANK ATLAS, (1983).
59 For a brief description of the various kinds of investments see Daniels,
supra note 6, at 405-427.
60 See generally DOUGLAS WOOD & JAMES BYRNE, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS FINANCE, (1981)(hereinafter "Wood & Byrne").
1994]
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profit maximization is the overall aim,6 1 the strategy of a partic-
ular investment may extend beyond pure financial gain.6 2 In
acquiring a foreign business, the parent corporation considers
an array of business factors such as the "locus of legal liability,
public image in the host country, managerial incentive consid-
erations, and local legal and political requirements."63 In short,
"planning an acquisition requires evaluating the target as a
controllable subset of the parent."64
Whereas tax considerations usually occupy a secondary an-
alytical level in domestic acquisitions,6 5 tax planning assumes
greater significance when international operations are in-
volved6 6 as both home and host countries assert tax jurisdiction
over the same business activity.67 Reducing the incidence of in-
ternational double taxation is therefore a universal objective
among MNCs, with most industrial countries providing one of
two models of relief for their resident corporations. 68 The ex-
emption model excludes all or portions of income that is gener-
ated overseas and repatriated to resident corporations69 while
the credit model taxes the overseas income of resident corpora-
tions but allows the taxpayer to credit some or all of the foreign
taxes it pays in the host country. 70 In short, the planning of
61 Daniels, supra note 6, at 20.
62 For example, the U.S. parent may invest in a market simply to secure raw
materials for distribution among its related companies.
63 DAVID K EITEMAN & ARTHUR I. STONEHILL, MULTINATIONAL
BUSINESS FINANCE, 648 (4th ed. 1986).
r4 JOHN P. KARALAIS, INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES: A PRACTI-
CAL GUIDE, § 1.15 (1992).
65 See HENRY MINTZBERG & ROBERT M. JAMES, THE STRATEGY PRO-
CESS (1988).
66 International Monetary Fund, "Tax Policy and Reform fore Foreign Invest-
ment in Developing Countries," in Taxation and International Capital Flows, (Or-
ganisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, comp. 1990), 163-192, at
171 (hereinafter "International Capital Flows").
67 See T. Modibo Ocran, Double Taxation Treaties and Transnational Invest-
ment: A Comparative Study, 2 Transnatl Law. 131, at 133 (1989)(hereinafter
"Ocran").
68 Richard D. Teigen, "International Taxation: A Guide for U.S. Corporations,"
18 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 291, at 293 (1992)(hereinafter "Teigen").
69 Yoseph Edrey & Adrienne Jeffrey, Taxation of International Activity: Over
Relief from Double Taxation Under the U.S. Tax System, 9 Int'l Tax & Bus. Law.
101, at 105 (1991)(hereinafter "Edrey & Jeffrey").
70 Id. at 107.
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international investments demand a solid understanding of the
tax saving provisions afforded by the relevant jurisdictions. 7 1
In entering new markets, manufacturing MNCs may or-
ganize an overseas operation according to a variety of legal enti-
ties, from nonequity arrangements, such as shortterm licensing
or distribution agreements, to longterm local production and as-
sembly plants.72 However, tax authorities of both home and
host countries place on top of these entities distinctions which
have no effect on business operations but nonetheless signifi-
cantly affect the business' total operating costs through differ-
ences in tax charges. 73 Hence the basic distinctions the
Internal Revenue Service ("the Service") employs in taxing the
global activities of U.S. MNCs are noted below.
C. Taxing U.S. MNCs
Like most countries, the U.S. tax law does not attach a stat-
utory meaning to the term multinational corporation. Instead,
the United States taxes resident corporations 74 on their world-
wide incomes. 75 This is done by dividing gross income into two
broad categories, domestic source income and foreign source in-
come. 76 Domestic source income is taxed currently, while for-
eign source income is generally not taxed until it is remitted to
the United States in a taxable form, such as dividends, interest
payments, or royalties. 77 However, certain types of foreign
source income are taxed currently by virtue of the level or type
of ownership interest the U.S. taxpayer has in a foreign entity
7' See Gregg D. Lemein & Debra Falduto Novack, International Mergers and
Acquisitions, 67 Taxes 844 (1989Xhereinafter cited as "Lemein & Novack").
72 STEFAN H. ROBOCK & KENNETH SIMMONDS, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, 214 (4th ed., 1989)("Robock
& Simmonds").
73 Entity classification is organized by I.R.C. § 7701 & Treas. Regs.
§§ 1.301.77011(c) and 301.77012.
74 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) (1986). Nonresidents corporations are taxed on U.S.
source income and income deemed to be 'effectively connected' with a U.S. trade or
business. I.R.C. § 881(a), 882(a)(1).
75 I.R.C. § 61(a).
76 Because I.R.C. § 61(a) defines gross income as "all income from whatever
source derived," the income sourcing rules of §§ 861865 divide income from each
category 'according to type.' JOSEPH ISENBERGH, 1 INTERNATIONAL TAXA-
TION, 94 (1990)(hereinafter "1 Isenbergh"). See also ROBERT A. RAGLAND,
TAXATION OF FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME (1990).
77 Teigen, supra note 68, at 329.
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and the nature of income itself (active or passive). Such rules,
called Subpart F, are more fully discussed in later sections. 78
Deductions must also be sourced to an activity that gives
rise to a taxable event.79 Treasury Regulation § 1.8618 'guides
the assignment of expenses to foreign or domestic income'80 by
directly allocating those expenses which are connected with a
particular class of gross income."' As there are several statutory
groupings8 2 within a class, the allocated expenses are then ap-
portioned among those groupings as such expense were in-
curred.83 Expenses that can be traced to all classes of income
within the class are apportioned to all gross income.8 4
Under the I.R.C. the concept that comes closest to the mul-
tinational corporation as it is commonly understood is that of
the "affiliated group," which is a group of domestic corporations
or possessions that are connected by at least 80% stock owner-
ship to a common parent.8 5 Such groups may file a consolidated
tax return for all U.S. entities therein.86
This Comment discusses some of the difficulties the U.S.
parent of manufacturing MNCs is likely to encounter in invest-
ing in South Africa via a foreign subsidiary or a joint venture.
This focus was chosen because foreign subsidiary is the entity
wherein "almost two thirds of U.S. exports" are funneled.8 7
78 See notes and accompanying text, infra.
79 U.S. tax jurisdiction is based on an 'economic nexus' approach which, gener-
ally speaking, recognizes expenses as deductions only when the expenses are at-
tached to the very income in which they were incurred to produce. Alan Wilensky,
Future Directions of U.S. International Tax Policy, 70 Taxes 998, at 1005 (1993)
[hereinafter "Wilensky"].
80 Id.
81 Treas. Reg.. § 1.8618(a)(2).
82 The statutory grouping of gross income is the gross income from a specific
source of activity, which must be determined before arriving at taxable income
from the specific source or activity under an operative section. Id.
83 Temp. Treas. Reg.. § 1,8618T(c)(1).
84 Treas. Reg. § 1.8618(b)(1).
95 I.R.C. § 1504(a).
86 A single, consolidated tax return can be filed by corporations of an affiliated
group under §§ 1501-1505 of the Internal Revenue Code and § 1.15024 of the
Treasury Regulations.
87 Statement of Peter Merrill, Price Waterhouse, representing the U.S. Mul-
tinational Corporation Tax Policy Coalition before the House Ways and Means
Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures, September 21, 1993, Tax Notes To-
day, September 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library TAXANA File.
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Likewise, foreign joint ventures8 8 have recently become a stra-
tegic means for U.S. MNCs to 'crack new markets,'8 9 as such
ventures permit U.S. MNCs to enter new markets without in-
curring the type of resource commitment that typically accom-
panies the establishment of foreign subsidiaries. 90 It is
assumed that many manufacturing U.S. MNCs will consider
these entities, among others, in evaluating the prospects of
profitable business investment in South Africa.
1. Foreign Subsidiaries.
Foreign subsidiaries are incorporated in jurisdictions other
than the Unites States and its possessions and thus stand as a
separate legal entities.91 Earnings and profits accrued by the
subsidiary are generally not subject to U.S. taxation until they
are remitted to the U.S. as dividends, rents, royalties, interest
payments or other categories.
The two main types of subsidiaries in U.S. tax law are that
of the minority owned foreign subsidiaries, referred to here as
"10/50" subsidiaries, and "controlled foreign corporation" (CFC)
varieties. In the former, the U.S. parent holds an interest that
is at least 10% but not greater than 50% of the company.92 As
noted, the earnings and profits of minorityowned U.S. subsidi-
aries in most instances are not taxed until they are repatriated
to the U.S. shareholder. Deferring the inclusion of the earnings
of foreign subsidiaries provides U.S. corporate shareholder an
opportunity to reduce includible foreign source income by the
time value of the effective tax rates in the relevant
jurisdictions. 93
Wholly owned subsidiaries or CFCs,94 on the other hand,
are corporations which operate in countries other than the one
88 The term 'foreign joint venture' encompasses various investment relation-
ships where the venture's equity is divided between at least two private compa-
nies. Daniels, supra note 6, at 9.
89 Wysocki, CrossBorder Alliances Become Favorite Way to Crack New Mar-
kets, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1990, at 1.
90 Robock & Simmonds, supra note 72, at 215.
91 I.R.C. § 7701(aX5)(1986).
92 This term draws from the revised foreign tax credit limitations, as noted
infra.
93 ISENBERGH, 2 INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, 20 (1990).
94 M.W. E. GLAUTIER, A REFERENCE GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION, 28 (1987).
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in which their ownership is controlled. 95 Under U.S. tax law, a
foreign subsidiary is a CFC when all combined 'U.S. sharehold-
ers' hold a total of 50% or more of the vote or stock.96 In turn, a
U.S. shareholder is a U.S. person or corporation that owns at
least 10% of the total combined voting power of the stock in a
foreign subsidiary.97 Thus if a U.S. multinational owns either
'directly, indirectly or constructively over 50% of the vote or
value' of a foreign subsidiary, the subsidiary is deemed to be
related to the U.S. MNC as a controlled foreign corporation.98
CFC status carries forth an array of complex tax provisions,
including rules designed "[t]o prevent U.S. corporations from
artificially shifting profits from international operations to their
foreign subsidiaries via 'transfer pricing.'-99 Rules known as
Subpart F currently tax the 10% CFC shareholders on certain
types of 'tainted income, 100 which includes, among others, 10 in-
come from insurance and various kinds of foreign base company
income. 102
2. Foreign Joint Ventures
Foreign joint ventures are typically formed through prop-
erty transfers, namely assets or stock, among or between 'a
group of previously unrelated corporations. 103 If the new entity
95 DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, SOUTH AFRICA, 94 (1993)("hereinaf-
ter "Deloitte, Touche, Tohmatsu").
96 I.R.C. § 957(a).
97 I.R.C. § 951(b).
98 Alan S. Lederman & Bobb Hirsh, The CFC Netting Rule Entangles
U.S.based Multinationals, 3 J. Int'l Tax'n 69, 70 (1992)(hereinafter "Lederman &
Hirsh").
99 Karl William Viehe & Donald T. Williamson, Tax Issues in Planning Trans-
national Transactions-The U.S. Perspective, 2 Transnat'l Law. 93, 107
(1989)(hereinafter "Viehe & Williamson").
100 I.R.C. § 951(a)(1).
101 For a concise review, see Teigen, supra note 68, at 33644.
102 Under § 954, a 'foreign base company income' includes income from gener-
ated services, shipping income, oilrelated activities, and sales of goods to and/or
from related parties in any country other than where the party is incorporated.
Also included is income from foreign personal holding companies. ANNAMARIA
RAPAKKO, BASE COMPANY TAXATION, 16 (1989).
103 J. FRED WESTON et al., MERGERS, RESTRUCTURING, AND CORPO-
RATE CONTROL, 738 (1990)(hereinafter 'Weston et al.").
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holds the transferred property as an incorporated company, 10 4
then the transferors are subject to strict non-recognition rules
on any gain in the property transferred. 10 5 The Service deter-
mines whether a particular foreign joint venture will be taxed
as a partnership or corporation, 10 6 although it defers to the law
of the host country in discerning the 'legal relationships among
the venturers, between the venturers and the public and control
of the venture's assets."10 7 The difference is significant. If the
joint venture is structured as a foreign corporation in which the
U.S. venturer holds a minority share, the U.S. shareholder is
taxed at the corporate rate on the venture's remitted earnings.
If the venture obtains CFC status, either initially or after other
U.S. interests are brought into it, the joint venture is subject to
Subpart F treatment and is taxed currently on the passive in-
come.' 08 In either case dividends received from a foreign joint
venture enjoy favorable foreign tax credit treatment. 0 9
On the other hand, a joint venture structured as a partner-
ship enables the U.S. corporate venturer to capture the tax ad-
vantages that exist under Subchapter K.1 0 To be considered a
foreign partnership for U.S. tax purposes, the foreign joint ven-
ture must lack at least two of the four main corporate character-
istics, namely continuity of life, free transferability of interests,
limited liability and centralization of management."' A ven-
ture so structured is treated as a passthrough entity, one that
escapes corporate taxes as the venture's activities are deemed
104 For a discussion of U.S. taxation of foreign joint ventures, see Bruce N. Da-
vis & Steven R. Lainoff, U.S. Taxation of Foreign Joint Ventures, 46 Tax L. Rev.
165 (1991) (hereinafter "Davis & LainofiT).
105 IR.C §§ 351, 367(a).
106 I.R.C. § 7701 and Treas. Regs. §§ 301.77011(c), 301.77012.
107 Davis & Lainoff, supra note 104.
108 D. Kevin Dolan, "Special Issues in Structuring International Joint Ven-
tures," 345 PLI/Tax 447 (1993), available in WESTLAW TXTP Database (herein-
after "Dolan 1993").
109 The venture's dividends escape the separate limitation baskets of § 904, as
discussed in Part II.B.1, infra.
110 See Louis S. Freeman & Thomas M. Stephens, Using a Partnership When a
Corporation Won't Do: The Strategic Use and Effects of Partnerships to Conduct
Joint Ventures and Other Major Corporate Business Activities, 68 Taxes 962 (Dec.
1990).
111 There is indication that the Service will interpret the absence of continuity
of life and free transferability of interests as sufficient for partnership status. Alan
P. Parnes, United States Tax Considerations in Organizing a Foreign Joint Ven-
ture, 20 J. Corp. Tax'n 3, 8 (1993)(hereinafter "Parnes").
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to be directly attributable to the U.S. corporate venturer. 112
The amounts of income, deductions and credits allocatable to
each partner is determined by the partnership agreement. 113 A
joint venture organized as a partnership also allows the U.S.
venturer to avoid the severe recognition rules which accompany
the contribution of property for joint venturers structured as
corporations." 4
With these considerations in mind, attention now shifts to
some of the ways U.S. parent corporations acquire and struc-
ture overseas businesses. For ease in presentation, the term
'U.S. parent' hereinafter refers to the U.S. corporate share-
holder that acquires or establishes a 'target,' which refers to an
existing South African company or one that is formed with the
U.S. parent.
3. Financing Overseas Operations
Just as there are many ways to skin a cat, so too are the
means by which U.S. parents acquire overseas companies both
numerous and unique." 5 This discussion centers on what is
perhaps the traditional method of corporate acquisition direct
purchase of stocks or assets. Hence the intricate ways of indi-
rect acquisition through foreign 'finance' or 'holding' compa-
nies"16 and the plethora of currency issues that accompany
international investments have been left for more capable
hands.117
Direct acquisitions divide into three broad categories: eq-
uity financing, debt-based financing and inter-company financ-
112 Allen Friedman, U.S. Tax Considerations in Choosing an Entity to Hold
Foreign Business Operations, 46 Tax Law. 15, 22 (1991)(hereinafter "Friedman").
113 I.R.C. § 704(a). Under § 482, the Service may subject the U.S. shareholder
to greater proportion of taxation on the venture's operations if it deems the share-
holder to have 'common control' of the venture. See Barrett & Rafferty, Section
482 and Nonrecognition Transfers, 45 Tax Notes 1239 (1989).
114 I.R.C. § 721.
115 For an excellent introductory discussion, see JULIAN S. ALWORTH, THE
FINANCE, INVESTMENT AND TAXATION DECISIONS OF MULTINATION-
ALS, (1988).
116 For an introductory discussion, see Wood & Byrne, supra note 60, at 170-
174.
117 For concise treatment of these topics, see generally SURENDRA K.
KAUSHIK & LAWRENCE M. KRACHOV, MULTINATIONAL FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT (1989Xhereinafter "Kaushik & Krachov").
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ing.118 In addition to its impact on the parent's global tax costs,
the choice of acquisition method shapes the target's initial capi-
tal structure and operating costs. Hence in capitalizing an
overseas operation, the parent's financial managers must deter-
mine an appropriate debt-to-equity ratio for the acquired affili-
ate to carry. 119 This ratio, the financial underpinning of any
business, will influence not only the initial acquisition method
but subsequent decisions as well, such as the distribution of
earnings. 120
Equity acquisitions involve the transfer of stocks from the
parent to the target in exchange for a controlling interest in the
target's voting stock. Under this method, U.S. tax liabilities do
not arise until the parent sells the acquired stock, at which time
the stock's basis will determine whether the parent accrued any
capital gains on the transfer.12' Otherwise, earnings and prof-
its retained by the affiliate increase the stock's taxable basis.122
Also, stock in an overseas business may be deemed as "foreign
assets" for various U.S. tax computations, including the foreign
tax credit election. 123
Debt-based acquisitions involve the purchase of assets such
as physical plant, real estate or even other debt obligations,
through the use of a debt obligation. Such transactions occur by
way of loans from thirdparty commercial lenders, debt instru-
ments in international monetary markets, such as Euromoney
and Eurobonds, or through the issuance of corporate bonds.124
Additionally, this type of borrowing can occur at three levels
within the MNC: at the level of the U.S. corporate group, at the
118 For an excellent overview of international acquisitions, see William G.
Cavanagh & Leslie J. Schreyer, U.S. Acquisitions of Foreign Corporations: selected
issues, 281 Prac. Law Inst. Tax. 7 (1989), available in WESTLAW, TXTP Database
(hereinafter "Cavanagh & Schreyer").
119 International Capital Flows, supra note 66, at 173-74.
120 SIDNEY M. ROBBINS & ROBERT B. STOBAUGH, MONEY IN THE
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE, 51 (1973)(hereinafter "Robbins & Stobaugh").
121 There are exceptions, as 'stock transfers to foreign jurisdiction for the pur-
poses of establishing a corporate joint venture are only tax free if the U.S. share-
holder holds less than 5% of the venture's voting stock or if holding 5% or more, the
U.S. shareholder enters into a share a gain recognition agreement. Davis & Lai-
noff, supra note 105, at 170.
122 Dolan 1993, supra note 108.
123 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.86112T(c).
124 Shapiro, supra note 57, at 656-676.
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level of the foreign corporate group within the same MNC or at
the level of the foreign target itself.
Finally, the multinational is itself a source of funding for
both the acquisition of foreign companies and financing the
later's working capital requirements. Inter-company financing
occurs whenever the U.S. parent or 'sister' affiliates 125 within
the corporate group secures a loan from a thirdparty lender and
then 'onlends' or transfers the loan proceeds to its affiliate as a
debt obligation. Thereafter, the affiliate makes interest pay-
ments to the parent while the parent pays interest to the origi-
nal lender.126 Overall inter-company lending has served as an
"effective means of cash management" where local finance is
scarce.' 27 The interest payments make it easier for the affiliate
to repatriate earnings to the United States because "dividend
payments and reduction in [the affiliate's] capital stock are
characteristically more closely controlled by governmental regu-
lations than are principal and interest payments."128
Of course the choice of acquisition method is drawn from a
mix of factors, including the types of income the parent wants
the acquired business to develop. Generally, debtfinanced ac-
quisitions are preferred over stockbased acquisitions because
such transactions take less time to complete and establish a
fixed amount of interest payable over for a specified period. 29
Debt also reduces 'cash buildups' within the subsidiary, thus
preserving the tax basis of original stock. 30 Equity financing,
on the other hand, reduces the parent's total stock holdings at
the moment of the transfer, jeopardizing (at least theoretically)
the corporation's financial stability.13 '
A key issue is whether interest expense incurred in acquir-
ing the target can be divided among the parent and target so as
125 A sister corporation to an affiliate is defined as one that has "common of
substantially common ownership by same shareholders." Black's Law Dictionary
1387 (6th ed. 1990).
126 Joseph L. Andrus, Robert H. Dilworth & Jeffrey M. O'Donnell, U.S. Tax
Considerations in Financing Foreign Subsidiaries, 68 Taxes 683, 703 (hereinafter
"Andrus et al.").
127 Lederman & Hirsh, supra note 98.
128 Robbins & Stobaugh, supra note 120, at 50-51.
129 John Livingston, Comment, Corporate Tax Integration in the United States:
A Review of the Treasury's Integration Study, 58 Mo. L. Rev. 717, at 719-20 (1993).
130 Kaushik & Krachov, supra note 117, at 99.
131 Friedman, supra note 112.
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to minimize global tax costs. 13 2 Placing debt 'downstream' or
onto the target occurs when the parent acquires only a part of
the target's assets, leaving the target to secure additional loans
to purchase outstanding stock or additional assets.13 3 Since the
affiliate's subsequent earnings are used to repay the loan, the
value of the affiliate's stock held by the U.S. parent is reduced.
Capitalizing the foreign affiliate in this manner generally oc-
curs only when the acquired company is permitted to deduct its
interest payments on the acquisition debt.
However the affiliate is acquired or established, the par-
ent's financial managers must also consider the affiliate's work-
ing capital requirements. Again the focus of this discussion is
limited to local financing and inter-company financing. Local
financing is perhaps the most frequently used method, as it is
often easier and cheaper for the affiliate to obtain loans given
its local credit rating than to request lending from related or
nonrelated sources outside the host country.134 Local financing
can also lessen the impact foreign exchange fluctuations and in-
flationary risks visit upon the affiliate. 135
The tax treatment of inter-company loans can differ signifi-
cantly between home and host jurisdictions. In the home coun-
try, regulations may require limitations on the loan amount and
a minimum or arm's length interest rate Conversely, the host
country may limit the maximum rate of interest and impose
withholding taxes on interest payments paid to related parties.
Still, the withholding tax rate may be lower than the applicable
U.S. income tax rate or a double taxation treaty may lower or
eliminate such taxes altogether. 36 In all the choice of post-ac-
quisition financing frequently involves a comparison of the
debttoequity requirements of the local and foreign lenders,
knowledge of the host country's equity limitations and tax con-
sequences, and an understanding of an equally complex set of
currency issues.137
132 Kingson 1992, supra note 36, at, 1766.
133 Cavanagh & Schreyer, supra note 118, at III(B)(1)(b).
134 Robbins & Stobaugh, supra note 120, at 6465.
35 Robock & Simmonds, supra note 72, at 544
136 Shapiro, supra note 57, at 370.
137 Robock & Simmonds, supra note 72, at 546.
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Contingent to all debtbased transactions in the present
context is the deductibility of interest expense in both the U.S.
and in the host country. In the ledgers of most U.S. manufactur-
ing MNCs, interest expense stands as one of the largest expend-
itures. The allocation and apportionment of interest expense
within an affiliated corporate group is one area in U.S. tax law
where the interplay of foreign tax provisions can significantly
alter the attractiveness of overseas investments. 138 This is due
to the complexity of the new interest expense allocation and
apportionment rules, which have not only created a "cottage in-
dustry"139 for international tax attorneys but, more fundamen-
tally, revised the planning objectives for most U.S. MNCs,
especially with respect to the financing of overseas
operations.140
Obviously, foreign taxes stand as the chief expense for U.S.
MNCs. Part II details the changes TRA 1986 introduced in both
the foreign tax credit election and interest expense rules and
discusses their general impact on the international tax plan-
ning for U.S. manufacturing MNCs.
PART II. INTEREST EXPENSE, FOREIGN TAX CREDITS AND U.S
MNCs
Although seven types of interest expense are defined in the
I.R.C., 141 only one trade or business interest 142 occupies our
attention. Business interest may be thought of as the cost of
borrowing funds which are needed to meet the corporation's
138 Joseph L. Andrus, Planning Under U.S. Expense Allocation Rules, 70 Taxes
1008, 1008 (1992) (hereinafter "Andrus 1992").
139 Charles Kingson, Foreign Tax Credit and Its Critics, 9 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 1, 5
(1991) (hereinafter referred to as "Kingson 1991").
140 Andrus 1992, supra note 138, at 1018.
141 Seven categories of interest expense: investment interest, passive activity
interest, personal interest, portfolio interest, qualified residence interest, and
trade or business interest. For a good discussion of interest expense under § 163
and the accompanying regulations, see Deborah Whitt, Interest Deductions after
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Revenue Act of 1987, 6 B.U.J. Tax Law 85
(1988)(hereinafter "Whitt").
142 " 'Trade or business expenditure' means an expenditure (other an a passive
activity expenditure or an investment expenditure) in connection with the conduct
of any trade or business other than the trade or business of performing services as
an employee. Temp Treas. Reg. § 1.1638T(b)(7). See also Whitt, supra note 141, at
109, note 161.
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ongoing capital requirements. 143 As noted business interest
represents a significant portion of a corporation's recurrent ex-
penditures and thus a critical area for tax planning. Periodi-
cally, however, even judiciously planned corporate expense
schedules are thrown a curve by substantial changes in tax law.
This is precisely what happened after the 1986 legislation.
TRA 1986 was borne in the interest of protecting the U.S.
tax base from being eroded by the worldwide activities of U.S.
corporations.14 4 It brought forth significant changes in expense
allocations among affiliate corporate groups and the crediting of
foreign taxes paid or deemed paid by the U.S. parents of such
groups. 145 Its primary reforms involved a substantial lowering
of maximum corporate tax rate, adding four income baskets to
§ 904(d) foreign tax credit limitation scheme and enacting an
entirely new interest allocation methodology through the intro-
duction of § 864(e). Together, these changes have "fundamen-
tally altered the economics of international acquisitions by U.S.
or U.S.owned persons."1
46
A. Lower Corporate Tax Rate
Perhaps the most conspicuous change lies in the lowering of
the maximum marginal corporate income tax rate from 46% to
34% (now 35%).147 Since the rate is one of the lowest in the
industrialized world, this change almost assures that a parent's
foreign tax liability on foreignsource income will exceed its U.S
tax liability on the same income. 148 Additionally, the lower rate
yields an interest deduction that in effect 'gives as a maximum
tax benefit 35 cents per dollar of interest expense.' 149 That is,
143 Andrus, supra note 138, at 1018.
144 Richard M. Hammer & Wesley N. Riemer, Coping with Separate Foreign
Tax Credit Limitations, 1 J. Int'l Tax'n 5, at 5 (1990)(hereinafter "Hammer &
Riemer").
145 Virginia M. Tarris, Foreign Tax Credit Limitation After Tax Reform: The
Separate Limitation Categories and the Application of the Lookthrough Rule, 42
Tax Law. 275, at 275 (1989).
146 Cavanagh & Schreyer, supra note 11.
147 The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 raised the corporate rate to 35%.
148 Ernest R. Larkins, International Commerce Through a Foreign Subsidiary:
Navigating the Anti-Haven Tax Shoals of the Internal Revenue Code, 9 Int'1 Tax &
Bus. Law. 64, at 83 (1991)(hereinafter "Larkins").
149 Andrus et al., supra note 126, at 687.
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there could be a loss in the amount of a deduction or credit
whenever the foreign tax rate exceeds 35%.
In order to fully understand the impact of the changes in
the treatment of interest expense, it is necessary to first explain
the changes that were made with respect to the foreign tax
credit election.
B. Changes in the Foreign Tax Credit Election
Because the earnings and profits of overseas operations can
be taxed in the U.S. as well as in the country in which it is gen-
erated, U.S. corporations may either credit or deduct all or por-
tions of taxes paid in foreign jurisdictions. As a deduction, paid
foreign taxes reduce the amount of taxable foreign source in-
come. 150 Because this choice simply lowers the marginal tax
rate applied to foreign source income, 15' the foreign tax deduc-
tion election is an ineffective means of controlling double taxa-
tion for most MNCs.
In contrast, the foreign tax credit, embodied in I.R.C.
§§ 901-908, provides a dollarfordollar reduction in the amount
of U.S. taxes owed on foreign source income.' 52 The difference
is substantial in that it is possible to completely offset U.S taxes
on foreign source income by claiming foreign tax credits to the
maximum allowable under § 904.153
This election 54 operates on two basic principles. U.S. cor-
porations may credit the foreign taxes paid or deemed to have
150 I.R.C. § 164(a)(3).
151 If a U.S. corporation has $100 in foreign source income and has paid $20 in
foreign taxes on that income, the amount of U.S. income tax on the same income is
$28, which is 35% of the $80 (amount of taxable income less the deduction). The
marginal tax rate on the $100 of foreign source income is then 48%, as opposed to a
combined tax rate of 55% if a deduction was not permitted.
152 I.R.C. 901(b). Upon using the foreign tax credit election, a corporation is
not permitted to deduct foreign taxes under I.R.C. § 275(a)(4)(A).
153 If a U.S. corporation pays $35 in foreign taxes in a country in which it gen-
erates $100 of foreign source income, the U.S. income tax liability of $35 on that
$100 of foreign source income is wiped out by the $35 of foreign tax credits. If the
foreign tax rate is less than or equal to the applicable U.S. tax rate, the marginal
tax remains the same as the U.S. corporate rate. When the foreign tax rate ex-
ceeds the U.S. rate, the overall amount of taxes paid by the corporation on foreign
source income will, in most situations, remain lower by crediting foreign taxes as
opposed to deducting foreign taxes.
154 I.R.C. § 901(a).
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been paid 5 5 by all of its foreign subsidiaries in which it holds at
least a 10% interest in stock (first tier corporations) and a per-
centage of the taxes paid by foreign corporations (second tier
corporations) which are themselves at least 10% owned by the
firsttier foreign subsidiary.' 56 Deemed paid foreign tax credits
relate to the receipt of remitted foreign source income. Because
earnings generated by foreign subsidiaries are not taxable until
remitted as dividends to the parent corporation, only those
taxes which were paid by the subsidiary in generating and re-
mitting such dividends may be used by the parent corporation
to offset its U.S. tax liabilities in receiving the dividends. 57
Secondly, a U.S. corporation cannot use income taxes paid in a
foreign country to reduce its U.S. income taxes on domestic
source income. In short, the foreign tax credits "cannot exceed
the U.S. tax that it offsets."'5 8
As such, § 904(a) limits the amount of foreign taxes which
can be credited against the amount of U.S. tax owed on foreign-
source income.' 59 A few years after Congress enacted the for-
eign tax credit election in 1918,160 an overall limitation was
established. That framework continues today, as § 904(d) limits
the crediting of foreign taxes to the lesser of either a) the actual
amount of foreign taxes paid or deemed paid or b) by the "ratio
of that foreignsource income bears to worldwide income multi-
plied by the U.S. income taxes on worldwide income."' 61 For
the latter, the limitation formula computes as
155 Treas. Reg. § 1.9011(c). Under § 902, a U.S. parent is deemed to have paid
a portion of the foreign taxes of a 10% foreign subsidiary. This portion is derived
by referring to the same dividendtoundistributed earnings ratio that the subsidi-
ary used in remitting dividends to the U.S. parent. Philip McGovern, Joint Appli-
cation of Section 304 and Subpart F Offers Foreign Tax Credit Planning
Opportunities, 19 Int'l Tax J. 7, 11 (1993).
156 Viehe & Williamson, supra note 99, at 101.
157 I.R.C. § 902.
158 1 Isenbergh, supra note 76, at 483.
159 I.R.C. § 904(a).
160 For a discussion of the foreign tax credit election and permutations it has
undergone during its seventysix year history, see 1 Isenbergh, supra note 76, at
471-81.
161 W. Theodore Kresge & Timothy Jay Throndson, IRS' Third Try AT CFC
Netting Regulations, J. Int'l Tax'n 156, at 156 (1991)(hereinafter "Kesge &
Throndson").
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FTC limitation Foreign Source Taxable Inc X (precredit U.S. taxFTC i in = Worldwide Taxable Inc. xon worldwide income)
A brief example illustrates how the limitation merely caps
the amount of credits that can be used against U.S. tax liability
on foreign source income. Assume a U.S. parent corporation
had, in 1983, $500 of domestic source income and $500 of for-
eign source income, for a total of $1,000 in worldwide income.
Tentative tax on its worldwide income at the previous tax rate
of 46% would have been $460 ($1,000 x .46). The maximum
amount of foreign tax credits which could have been credited
against this precredit tax liability was $230 (($500/$1,000) x
$460). Thus, if the U.S. parent paid a total of $250 in credita-
ble foreign taxes on the $500 deemed as total foreign source in-
come, only $230 of that could be used. The excess $20 ($250-
$230) could be carried back two years or forward five years. 162
Beginning in 1960, separate limitations were established
for certain types of income or "baskets," such as non-business
interest income. 163 However, the overall active income limita-
tion of § 904 covered most types of overseas activities. 6 4 Ex-
cept for these narrowly defined baskets, foreign source income
from all overseas affiliates were lumped together to determine
the total amount of foreign tax credits a U.S parent could use
against its U.S. tax liability on foreign source income. This
crediting scheme permitted excess foreign tax credits generated
in a hightax jurisdiction to 'cross over' and be absorbed by the
income from lowtax jurisdictions. By generating sources of for-
eign source income which were, on average, taxed at rates near
the applicable U.S. rate, all of the credits in the general limita-
tion basket could be used. 165
Thus, in continuing the previous example, assume that the
U.S. parent's total foreign source income ($500) came from two
162 I.R.C. § 904(c).
163 D. Kevin Dolan & Carolyn M. DuPuy, The Foreign Tax Credit Overview
and Creditability Issues, 901 Tax Managment § at A32 (hereinafter "Dolan &
DuPuy').
164 Kingson 1991, supra note 10.
165 Virginia M.Tarris, Foreign Tax Credit Limitation After Tax Reform: the
Separate Limitation Categories and the Application of the LookThrough Rule, 42
Tax Law. 275, at 275 (1989)(hereinafter "Tarris").
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wholly owned subsidiaries operating in different countries. 166
Assume further that each subsidiary contributed an equal
amount of foreign source income ($250) and that the foreign
credit tax limitation was $230. If one subsidiary remitted ac-
tive income that was taxed at a rate of 60% while the other re-
mitted active income that was taxed at 40%, the combined
amount of foreign taxes paid on the first remitted $500 would
have been $250 ($150 on the first income ($250 x .60) plus $100
on the second ($250 x .40)).
It must be remembered that foreign tax credit limitation
baskets set ceilings on the amount of foreign taxes which could
be credited against U.S. tax liability. Obviously, these ceilings
depend on the amount of foreignsource income placed therein.
To determine the taxable foreignsource income, the foreign tax
credit election requires the gross foreignsource income of each
basket to be reduced by all deductions allocable to those limita-
tion baskets. 167
The limitation scheme has undergone several permutations
over the years.' 68 In 1976, the overall limitation was modified to
permit the crediting of foreign taxes paid on certain types of
foreignsource income, including interest income, according to
the ratio those sources contributed to the U.S. parent's world-
wide income.' 69 This limited the application of foreign tax cred-
its on such income sources to the U.S. effective income tax rate
that would be imposed on the same income.' 70
Hence prior to 1987, three main principles organized the
international tax planning for most U.S. MNCs. The overall
goal was to raise the U.S. parent's general income foreign tax
credit limitation by increasing the proportion of gross foreign-
source income contributed to their worldwide incomes. A high
foreignsource income to worldwide income ratio actually re-
duced U.S. tax liability on all repatriated income.
166 This example is drawn from Teigen, supra note 68, at 318.
167 Kresge & Throndson, supra note 161, at 157.
168 Between 1954 and 1976, taxpayers could chose to have their foreign tax
credits computed by the basket limitations or on a per country basis. In 1976 the
per country limitations were replaced. 1 Isenbergh, supra note 76, at 478.
169 Joseph J. Czajkowski, US foreign tax credit, 6 Intertax 224, 228
(1989)(hereinafter "Czajkowski").
170 1 Isenbergh, supra note 76, at 532.
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Secondly, timing the repatriation of foreign source income
stood as an important planning feature. U.S. MNCs deferred
inclusion of foreign source income until the parent accumulated
sufficient foreign tax credits to offset inclusion of foreign source
income from a particular source.
The third tax planning principle arose in response to
changes made in 1984 when 'look through' treatment of
§ 904(d)(3) was introduced. At that time the look through rules
excluded the dividends, interest and Subpart F inclusions of
CFCs from the basket limitations and instead computed sepa-
rate limitations for each type of income. 171 This change affected
the blending of tax rates as such income is invariably taxed at
rates lower than the rate imposed on active business. With
these rules in mind, U.S. MNCs simply had their minority
owned foreign subsidiaries generate the very types of income
that otherwise would trigger separate basket treatment had a
CFC generated such income. 172 Such adjustments not only
avoided the separate basket limitations but also increased by
the overall amount of foreign taxes creditable by lumping as
much foreign source income into the activesource limitation.
Hence in returning to the previous example, the U.S. parent
would have computed a separate foreign tax credit limitation if
one of the subsidiaries was a CFC. Dividends received from the
nonCFC subsidiary would have gone into the general foreign
source income category.
In an effort to prevent further erosion of the U.S. tax base,
TRA 1986 significantly revamped the foreign tax credit election.
Four baskets were added to the § 904(d) limitations, increasing
the number of limitations baskets to nine. The second and most
important change lies in the requirement that the limitation
formula noted on page is to be made for each foreign tax credit
income basket.173 As such, the gross foreign source income of a
U.S. parent can be, if applicable, divided into eight narrowly de-
fined, 'separate limitation' baskets, with the rest falling into one
'residual' or 'general limitation' basket. 174 This all encompass-
ing framework was bolstered by provisions that anticipate in-
171 Czajkowski, supra note 169, at 229.
172 Dolan & DuPuy, supra note 163, at A34.
173 I.R.C. § 904(d)(2).
174 Edrey & Jeffrey, supra note 70, at 115.
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stances where items of income can be classified in several
baskets, as noted below. Overall these changes were intended
to prevent U.S. MNCs from investing overseas in order to maxi-
mize their foreign tax credit election.
The breadth of these changes lies in the enactment of sev-
eral separate limitation baskets for a number of types of income
which traditionally have been viewed as passive income. Hence
the 'main' passive income basket of § 904(d)(2) extends the pre-
vious definition of non-business interest income to include the
types of income associated as "personal holding company in-
come." 175 However, this definition excludes active rents and
royalties from unrelated person, 176 export financing income, 77
and "high tax kick out" income, 78 which is interest income that
is taxed at an effective tax rate that exceeds the highest U.S.
rate. 79 These exceptions were enacted to prevent 'the U.S. par-
ent from blending hightaxed, foreignsource passive income with
lowtaxed foreign source passive income' (emphasis added)1S°
Other types of passive income are now granted 'basket'
treatment. High withholding tax interest is one of these crea-
tures, as it captures any interest income received from a
nonCFC foreign subsidiary which was subject to a withholding
175 In I.R.C. § 954(c)(1)(AE), foreign personal company holding interest is de-
fined as dividends, net gains on certain property transactions involving no gain or
passivelike gains, net gains from commodities, foreign currency gains, and net
gains from certain foreign currency transactions. See Hammer & Riemer, supra
note 144, at 6.
176 Treas. Reg. § 1.9044(b)(2). These items are excluded from this basket be-
cause active trade or business may legitimately generate rent and royalty pay-
ments,and would be taxed at rates higher than what typically accompanies the
creation of passive income. Hammer & Riemer, supra note 144, at 6.
177 I.R.C. § 904(d)(A)(iii)(II); Treas Reg. § 1.90944(b)(1). This exception covers
net gains derived from the financing of the sale of property by the taxpayer (e.g.
U.S. parent) or related party that was manufactured or produced in the United
States and was later used or consumed outside the U.S. This exception is also
favorable to the taxpayer because such interest income is directly related to active
trade or business and should not be characterized as an activity that is taxmoti-
vated. Hence such income is placed in the residual basket. Hammer & Riemer,
supra note 144, at 7.
178 I.R.C. §§ 904(d)(2XA)(iii)(III); 904(dX2)(F); Treas. Reg. § 1.9044(c)(1).
179 The exception removes what is otherwise passive income from this basket
and places in the residual basket because of the high rate in which it was taxed.
The Service determines whether such passive income warrantes the kick out ex-
ception after expenses are deducted from gross foreign income and effective tax
rates are computed and compared. Hammer & Riemer, supra note 144, at 7.
1so Teigen, supra note 68 at 320.
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tax of 5% or higher.181 Such interest income may actually be
subject to a high effective tax rate if the withholding tax is im-
posed on gross interest income.' 8 2 Similarly, the 'financial serv-
ices income' constitutes a separate basket as well,183 covering
active income from banking, income from insurance invest-
ments, insurance income and income which is generated by fi-
nancial dealings not covered by other baskets. 84
A separate basket was also carved out for dividends re-
ceived from each non-controlled § 902 corporation. 185 Such a
corporation exists whenever the U.S. parent owns at least 10%
of the voting power but not more than 50% of the voting power
(10/50 subsidiaries). In requiring that the limitation is calcu-
lated for each subsidiary, this basket effectively prevents a U.S.
parent from blending the tax rates of its network of 10/50 sub-
sidiaries.186 This change also affects the post-acquisition distri-
butions of acquired companies, as dividends paid out by the
company's pre-acquisition earnings fall into this basket. 8 7
The remaining separate limitation baskets cover shipping
income,' 88 certain dividends from an existing or former Domes-
tic International Sales Corporation, L8 9 certain distributions
from a Foreign Sales Corporation, 190 and income from certain
kinds of foreign trade. 19 ' These are narrowly defined baskets
and have little impact on most U.S. corporations.
All other incomes, such as manufacturing, marketing and
service profits,"192 fall into the residual or general limitation
basket. Although the additional baskets cover all types of pas-
sive income a U.S. MNC may develop, a, 1992 Service report
showed that nearly '75% of all foreign source income falls in the
181 I.R.C. § 904(d)(2)(B).
182 Hammer & Riemer, supra note 144, at 8. This basket was intended to pre-
vent banks from generating foreign tax credits simply by lending in countries
which impose a withholding tax. See David E. Spencer, Separate Basket Rules Re-
duce Incentives for International Lending, 4 J. Int'l Tax'n 89, at 91 (1993).
183 I.R.C. § 904(d)(2)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.9044(e).
184 Hammer & Riemer, surpa note 144, at 7.
185 I.R.C. § 904(d)(2XE).
186 I.R.C. § 904(d)(1)(E).
187 Lemein & Novack, supra note 71, at 857.
188 I.R.C. § 904(dX2)(D).
189 I.R.C. § 904(dX1XF).
190 I.R.C. § 904(d)(1)(H).
191 I.R.C. § 904(dX)(1G).
192 Edrey & Jeffrey, supra note 70, at 116, note 54.
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residual basket. ' 193 Hence it is quite possible that a corporation
need only refer to that basket in calculating its foreign tax
credit limitation.194
The limitation scheme applies to the deemed paid credit
provisions under § 902. As such, U.S. shareholders of partner-
ships are permitted to credit its proportionate share of the for-
eign taxes paid by the partnership.195
In conjunction with these changes, TRA 1986 expanded the
"look thru" treatment of CFC income. 196 Under § 904(d)(3),
when a CFC remits earnings to its U.S. parent, the sourcing of
the remittance for foreign tax credit purposes is not determined
on the basis of the parent's earnings but rather is determined
on the basis of the CFC's income producing activities. 197 To
properly assign such remittances to the limitation baskets, the
corporate taxpayer looks through or past the form in which the
remittances were made, such as dividends or interest pay-
ments, and re-characterizes the remittances according to the
types of income the CFC actually generates. 9 Once re-charac-
terized, the income is then placed within the framework of the
nine foreign tax credit limitations. Likewise, when the CFC
generates Subpart F income the credit for foreign taxes is
claimed under § 960, with the income divided to the CFC's un-
derlying income. 199 The relevant passive income is treated sep-
arately to the extent the CFC receives income in that
category.200
There are important exceptions in the application of the
limitation baskets to partnerships. 20 1 Here the focus is limited
to the rules that apply to partner holding at least a 10% inter-
est, assuming that a manufacturing MNC would desire a con-
trolling or near controlling interest in a South African
193 John Turro, Tax Policy: U.S. Treasury's Interim Report on International
Tax Reform Offers Policy Framework, 6 Tax Notes Intl 378, at 379 (Feb. 15,
1993X"Interim Report").
194 Id. at 538.
195 I.R.C. 901(b)(5); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.901 1(a)(1), 1.9011(a)(3)(iii).
196 I.R.C. § 904(dX3).
197 See Teigen, supra note 69 at 3256 for an illustration.
198 This includes all Subpart F income under I.R.C. § 904(d)(3)(B).
199 I.R.C. § 904(d)(3)(B).
200 Treas. Reg. § 1.9045(c)(1Xi).
201 Davis & Lainoff, supra note 105.
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affiliate. 20 2 If a U.S. corporate partner owns 10% or more of a
partnership, that partner looks through the partnership to de-
termine which § 904 baskets cover its distributive share of part-
nership income. 20 3 If the high tax kick out exception applies,
the 10% partner's share of passive income is separated and re-
characterized if applicable as general source income. For the
high withholding tax basket, 20 4 the partner's share of such in-
terest maintains the basket.20 5 Finally, look through treatment
results where a partnership pays interest, rents or royalties to a
10% partner in a manner that would have triggered look-
through treatment had a foreign corporation made the payment
to a related party.20 6
2. Summary of Foreign Tax Credit Changes
Typically a manufacturing MNC will have most of its for-
eign source income fall into residual or general limitation bas-
kets and generally speaking will have most of its active income
source taxes at rates which are higher than 35%. Investments
made prior to 1986 that generated certain types of passive in-
come, taxed for the most part at rates substantially lower than
the corporate tax, at least partially offset the buildup of excess
credits from business operations in hightax jurisdictions.
Hence the substantial lowering of the corporate tax rate
and changes in the crediting of foreign taxes have placed most
U.S. manufacturing MNCs in a position of having a 'chronic ex-
cess of foreign tax credits.'20 7 More precisely, U.S. MNCs will
have 'excess foreign tax credits in the active income basket and
excess limitation in the other separate baskets."20 Since credit
202 For a full discussion see Davis & Lainoff, supra note 105. Also, the financial
service income basket of § 904(d)(1)(C) is not applicable under these assumptions.
203 Treas. Reg. § 1.9045(h)(1).
204 I.R.C. § 904(d)(1)(B).
205 Davis & Lainoff, supra note 105.
206 I.R.C. § 904(d)(5)(CO; Treas. Reg. § 1.9045(h)(1); see also Davis & Lainoff,
supra note 105.
207 Andrus 1992, supra note 138, at 1128.; Larkins, supra note 148, at 64; An-
dre P. Fogarasi et al, U.S. Foreign Tax Policy And American Business Competitive-
ness in the Global Marketplace, in U.S. FOREIGN. TAX POLICY: AMERICA'S
BERLIN WALL (IRET, ed. 1991), at 41.
208 Roy D. Hogg & Jack M, Mintz, "Impacts of Canadian and U.S. Tax Reform
on the Financing of Canadian Subsidiaries of U.S. Parents," in Studies in Interna-
tional Taxation, (Alberto Giovaninni et al., ed., 1993), 4776, at 58.
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limitations must be calculated for each income basket, the
blending of the credits generated from lowtax jurisdictions with
those generated in a hightax jurisdiction is now limited to the
extent each limitation basket contains sources of income which
are taxed at different rates. Thus, the amount of excess foreign
tax credits for U.S. corporations went from $800 million in 1986
to $2.3 billion two years later.2 9
These changes severely restrict the ability of American
MNCs to use foreign tax credits as a means of reducing their
U.S. tax liability on worldwide income. As a result, U.S. manu-
facturing MNCs must now search for ways to "generate lowtax,
general basket, foreignsource income and/or reduce the effective
foreign tax rate by increasing the expenses of its foreign opera-
tions."210 The latter option using expenses to reduce foreign
source is also directed by the TRA 1986 reforms with respect to
interest expense, as discussed in the next section.
C. Interest Expense Allocations with Affiliated Groups
Prior to TRA 1986, the 1977 Regulations allocated an affili-
ated group's interest expense for foreign tax credit purposes on
a companybycompany basis. 211 Under those regulations, inter-
est expense within an affiliated group was considered a 'fungi-
ble' resource that affected all incomeactivities within the
group.212 Interest expense which is not specifically linked to a
set of assets or incomeproducing activities is "attributable to all
activities and property regardless of any specific purpose for in-
curring an obligation on which interest is paid."213 The ratable
portion is allocated to gross income generated by all of the cor-
poration's income producing activities and properties.2 14 Each
entity in an affiliated group allocated interest expense between
domestic and foreign source income according to either the
value of the assets which generated the income in which the
209 Michael S. Schadewald & D. Eric Hirst, An ABC Approach to Reducing Ex-
cess Foreign Tax Credits, 19 Int'l Tax J. 83, 83 (1993).
210 Philip L. Tretiak, "Tax Planning for U.S. Multinationals," 19 Intl Tax J.
67, 7574 (1993).
211 Patrick, Converting Income and Expenses to Domestic or Foreign Source, 6
Taxes 1045 (1984).
212 Treas. Reg. § 1.8618(e)(2)(i)(1 9 77 ).
213 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.8619T(a).
214 Treas. Reg. § 1.8618(eX2)(ii)(1977).
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interest was incurred 215 or the amount of gross income gener-
ated by the assets in question.216 Under the gross assets
method, the parent corporation could allocate its interest ex-
pense on a companybycompany basis, irrespective of whether
an affiliated entity actually received a loan.217
These rules prompted MNCs to organize the asset struc-
tures and income activities their domestic and foreign subsidi-
aries in ways that maximized the foreign tax credit election. 218
Substantial tax savings could be gathered simply by shifting
the group's borrowing activities from overseas operations to do-
mestic subsidiaries which produced only domestic source in-
come.219 Parent corporations apportioned interest expense to
the domestic source incomes of their affiliated companies,
thereby reducing their domestic tax liabilities.220
Attributing expenses this way prompted U.S. MNCs to
make substantial use of inter-company lending for their over-
seas affiliates.221 Since the U.S. parent deducted the interest
incurred in securing the loan in the United States, the subse-
quent interest income from the repaying foreign affiliate re-
sulted in a 'wash' for U.S. tax purposes. However, the interest
income inflated the parent's source of foreign income, thus rais-
ing the overall activesource income basket. In short, applying
the allocation regulations on a company by company basis per-
mitted the U.S. parent to lessen the amount of expenses attrib-
utable to foreign source income. 222 Thus it is not surprising
that in 1986, the reported net foreign source income of U.S. cor-
porations exceeded $140 billion, a sum representing over 50% of
their worldwide incomes. 223
215 Treas. Reg. § 1.8618(e02)(v)(1977).
216 Treas. Reg. § 1.8618(eX2Xvi)(1977).
217 Id.
218 Andrus 1992, supra note 138, at 1009.
219 Sellers & Thomas, supra note 8, at 152.
220 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, U.S. TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL IN-
COME, 102 (1992Xhereinafter "Hufbauer").
221 Timothy F. Windholtz & Joseph E. Bernot, International RelatedParty
Debt: Part II, 2 J. Intl Tax'n 147, at 147 (1991).
222 Id.
223 Rosanne Altehuler & Scott Newton, The Effects of U.S. Tax Policy on the
Income Repatriation Patterns of U.S. Multinational Corporations, in STUDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, 77, at 77 (Alberto Giovannnini et al., eds., 1993).
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Combined, the pre1986 foreign tax credit limitation scheme
and interest expense allocation rules produced "an unwar-
ranted increase in the amount of foreign tax credits available to
an affiliated group of corporations."224 In seeking to prevent
"U.S. taxpayers from arranging their affairs to maximize the
foreign tax credit at the expense of U.S. taxes on U.S. source
income,"225 Congress substantially reformed the sourcing of ex-
penses among affiliated corporations. 226
1. New Interest Expense Allocation Rules
Through the enactment of § 864(e), TRA 1986 completely
reformulated the allocation of interest expense within affiliated
corporate groups for foreign tax credit purposes. A new ration-
ale called "water's edge fungibility" attributes the interest ex-
pense of all U.S. entities of an affiliated group to all income
within the group. Affiliated companies are treated "as if they
are one taxpayer rather than separate taxpayers."221 Since any
loan within an affiliated corporate group could have been se-
cured by any or all of the group's assets, the interest deduction
should be ratably spread across all of the group's income pro-
ducing activities. 228 A key distinction is made, however, in that
the interest expense of U.S. each entity within the affiliated cor-
porate group ripples across the income of the entire group while
the interest expense of each foreign subsidiary within the same
group travels only as far as the edge of its own income.
As such, all U.S. entities which file or are eligible to file a
U.S. consolidated return 29 now allocate interest expense on a
consolidated group basis to the domestic and foreign source in-
come of the entire group.230 To meet these changes, "affiliated
group" assumes a broader meaning for interest expense pur-
224 HOUSE COMMITTE REPORT, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 1396.
225 RICHARD DOERNBERG, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN A NUT-
SHELL, 165 (2nd ed., 1993).
226 Andrus 1992, supra note 138, at 11056.
227 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EX-
PLANATION OF TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 513 (1986); see I.R.C. § 864(eXl).
228 I.R.C. § 864(eX); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.86111T.
229 See note 5 and accompanying text, supra.
230 I.R.C. §§ 864(e)(1) and (6).
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poses231 and an assetbased apportionment methodology re-
places the previous separate, companybycompany approach.
Apportionment fractions organize the interest deductions
by comparing the value of the incomeproducing domestic and
foreign assets within the group.232 After aggregating the inter-
est expense of all U.S. entities within the affiliated group, the
total is first re-divided by class of gross income233 and then by
all foreign and domestic sources of income within each class. 23 4
The taxpayer's choice now falls in the area of valuation method,
in that the assets can be valued either by an adjusted tax basis
or tax book value or, alternatively, at their fair market value. 235
Values for total foreign assets and total domestic assets form
the basis for allocating an amount of aggregate interest expense
to each class of gross income. However, the assets of a foreign
branch 236 of a U.S. corporation 237 are valued by direct examina-
tion of the adjusted tax basis 238 while the foreign subsidiary's
assets are valued by the shareholder's basis in the subsidiary's
stock increased by undistributed earnings.239
For example, 240 in 1986 a parent corporation held in-
comeproducing domestic assets which had a value of $1000 and
incomeproducing foreign assets also valued at $1000. The par-
ent earned $200 in domesticsource income and received $100 in
foreign source income from its non-controlled foreign subsidiary
in a taxable year. The latter incurred $15 of interest expense
while the parent incurred $60 of interest expense Only $60 of
interest is allocable against the parent's consolidated income. If
the allocations were based on gross income within the affiliated
group ($300), twothirds of aggregate interest expense 2/3 of
231 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.86111T(d)(2) requires the inclusion of Section 936
corporations in the definition of "affiliated group" set forth in § 1504(a).
232 I.R.C. § 864(e)(2), Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.86111T(c).
233 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.8618(a)(2).
234 I.R.C. § 864(e)(2).
235 Treas. Reg. § 1.8619T(g)(1)(ii). Each approach uses an average of the begin-
ning year and ending year values. Taxexempt assets are excluded in this determi-
nation under I.R.C. § 864(e)(3).
236 Branches are viewed as integrated units of U.S. corporations and their
earnings are taxed currently by the U.S. under residence jurisdiction. 1 Isen-
bergh, supra note 99, at 151.
237 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.8619T(f)(2).
238 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.86112T(c).
239 This example is drawn from 1 Isenbergh, supra note 99, at 208.
240 I.R.C. § 864(e)(7)(C).
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$600 or $400 would be allocated to domesticsource income ($60
x $200/$300). However, under the asset method, the aggregate
interest expense is split in half because the values of domestic
assets and foreign assets were equal. Thus $30 would have
been allocated to both foreign source income and domestic
source income.
Thereafter allocated amounts are re-divided between statu-
tory and residual groupings within foreign source and domestic
source income and then among the separate foreign tax credit
baskets. 241 Expenses allocated to foreign source income must
then be apportioned among the relevant income baskets for for-
eign tax credit purposes. Here again the apportionment occurs
under the assets method 242 and § 864(e) also adjusts the basis
of the stock of foreign subsidiaries whenever their earnings are
retained. In the example above the $300 allocated to each gross
income class divides into deductions for the relevant income
baskets within the class. So if the foreign source income of
$1000 is comprised of $500 from the active income basket and
$500 from the passive income basket, then the $300 is once
more split in half and apportioned to each of these baskets as a
$150 deduction.
The application of these rules increases in complexity by
the number of affiliates and sources of income involved.243 As-
sume a U.S. parent owns a CFC and a non-controlled § 902 cor-
poration in the same host country, W. Assume that the CFC
earns $1000 in general income while the noncontrolled § 902
corporation remits $500 in dividends (total foreign source in-
come $1500). Income and withholding taxes paid or deemed
paid in host country W total $750. If no expenses are appor-
tioned to these income baskets, then the foreign tax credit limi-
tation for the $1000 of general income is $350 (U.S. tax rate
multiplied by the amount) while the foreign tax credit limita-
tion for § 902 corporate dividends is $175 (35% of $500). That is,
$525 of $750 in foreign taxes paid in W can be used to offset
U.S. tax on the $1500 in foreign source income.
241 I.R.C. § 864(e)(2).
242 See Williams & Havard, Foreign Tax Credit Rules are a Real Basket Case
for US Expatriates, 17 Tax Management Int'l J. 555 (1988).
243 Leonard, supra note 12, at 499.
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The same result occurs if no separation of income exists
(35% of $1500 = $525). However, if interest expense is appor-
tioned among the baskets, a different sum results. Assume
$300 in interest expense is allocated to the foreign source in-
come class and that the value of the CFC's assets total $10,000
while the value of the noncontrolled § 902 corporation's assets
equal $5,000. Apportioning the $300 interest expense based on
these values results in having a $200 deduction in the general
income from the CFC ($1000$200= $800) and a $100 deduction
in the § 902 dividend income basket ($500$100= $400). The for-
eign tax credit limitations are adjusted down to $280 (35% of
$800) and $140 (35% of $400), respectively. The apportionment
of interest expense among the foreign source income baskets re-
sulted in a loss of $105 in foreign tax credits (from $525 to
$420).
Compounding the loss of $105 in foreign tax credits is the
likelihood that the host country, W, will not permit a deduction
for the amounts apportioned to the CFC and noncontrolled
§ 902 corporations. Rather, only interest expense accrued from
loans secured within W are likely to be deductible. Thus, with-
out the presence of substantial local debt obligations, greater
amounts of foreign source income are subject to double taxation.
Such losses may increase the effective U.S. tax rate by several
percentage points.2 "
There are three circumstances in which § 864(e) departs
from the assetbased allocation scheme and permits interest ex-
pense to be directly allocated to domesticsource income, foreign-
source income by way of foreign tax credit limitation basket or
foreignsource income.245 The first instance, called qualified
non-recourse indebtedness, involves interest on indebtedness
arising from the acquisition of specific property.246 To qualify,
244 T. Timothy Tuerff and Keith F. Sellers, Taking Advantage of Exceptions to
Assetbased Apportionment, 1 J. Int'l Tax'n 261, 261 (1991).
245 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.86110T(a), (b).
24 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1. 86110T(b)(2)(i)(v). To begin with, the loan must have
the purpose of either improving real property or tangible personal property or
purchasing amortizable property. Loan proceeds can only be used to purchase or
improve the property. The loan instrument must attach to the property and the
creditor can only look to that property as security. Income generated by the prop-
erty must be of an amount that would assure repayment of the loan obligations.
Lastly, the loan instrument must also restrict the means of disposing of the prop-
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five conditions concerning the debt and the property must be
met.247 If these conditions are satisfied, the interest expense is
directly allocated to domestic source income and the values of
the specific property, interest and income generated by the
property are not calculated in the allocation and apportionment
calculations. The theory behind this exception is that the loan
and accompanying interest payments areso closely related to
the 'particular property and income generated therefrom that
application of the fungibility rule is not justified by economic
realties.'248
The second exception is for integrated financial transac-
tions, which consist of loans used to fund term financial invest-
ments. Here again several conditions attach,249 and if met, the
interest expense is directly allocated to the income generated by
the investment. 250 The purpose of this exception is to "enable
corporations to arbitrage financial instruments or to incur in-
terest expense to carry portfolio investments without reducing
their foreign tax credit."251 Since neither of these narrow excep-
tions correspond with the focus of this Comment, the discussion
shifts to the third and most controversial exceptions known as
the 'CFC netting rule' which has had a significant impact on
U.S. manufacturing MNCs.
2. CFC Netting Rule
Prior to 1986, inter-company lending provided clear tax
benefits for U.S. MNCs in that such loans increased the group's
foreignsource income through the payment of interest by the
foreign affiliate (foreignsource interest income) while at the
same time reducing U.S. source income through the interest de-
duction incurred on the original loan. 25 2 The Service considered
such financing as tax motivated and sought ways to equalize
erty according to the creditor's right to look to the property as security. The expec-
tation is measured by cash flow. 1 Isenbergh, supra note 99, at p.2 11.
247 Joseph E. Bernot, Allocating Interest Expense Under the Direct Allocation
Provisions of the Temporary Regulations, 16 Intl Tax J. 89, 9192 (1990Xhereinaf-
ter "Bernot").
248 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.86110T(c)(2)(i)(vi).
249 Temp. Treas. Reg.. § 1.86110T(c)(1).
250 Bernot, supra note 247, at 102.
251 Kresge & Throndson, supra note 161, at 157.
252 Andrus 1992, supra note 138, at 1128.
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the U.S. tax treatment of inter-company lending with that of
offshore third party loans.253 However, since the allocation and
apportionment of interest expense scheme under § 864(e) spe-
cifically exclude CFCs, 254 TRA 1986 could not by itself meet this
goal. Instead, special interest expense allocation rules for CFCs
were enacted in 1987. Known as the CFC netting rule255 final
regulations emerged, after three attempts,256 in April 1992
that cover loans to CFCs by U.S. corporate taxpayers which own
at least 10% of CFC's stock.257
In determining foreign source taxable income, portions of
the parent's third party interest expense is now directly alloca-
ble to the interest income receives it from related CFCs. In ef-
fect, this rule monitors, through a three step process, the inter-
company lending according to the parent's debt-to-assets ratio
and the debt-to-assets ratios for all of its CFCs. 258 The first step
involves determining 'whether the ratio of the collective CFCs'
debt to the U.S. parent and the value of the affiliated group's
assets have increased over a corresponding base period ratio.'259
The total amount of a CFCs' debt deemed to be linked to an
increased ratio is called "excess related group indebtedness"
("ERGI") and requires several calculations to derive. 260 The
foreign base period ratio a figure usually representing the pre-
ceding five years serves as a baseline of the U.S. parent's inter-
company lending activities with regard to its CFCs.
26 1
The second step determines whether the ratio of the par-
ent's third party debt to its assets increased over a U.S. base
period ratio. The total amount of third party debt owed by the
U.S. parent that is linked to an increased ratio in this respect is
called 'excess U.S. shareholder group indebtedness' ("EUSSI").
Again, several calculations are required to derive this
253 Sanford H. Goldberg et al., Final Regs. on Interest Allocation Clarify the
Netting Rule, 77 J. Tax'n 176, at 176 (1992).
254 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.86110T(e).
255 Kresge & Throndson, supra note 161, at 156. See Paul Bodner & Thomas
Bryan, New Allocation and Apportionment Regs. Contain Contraditctory Ap-
proaches, 75 J. Tax'n 112 (1991); Bernot, supra note 247.
256 Temp. Treas. Reg. 1.86110T(e)(1), (e)(2)(i).
257 Andrus 1992, supra note 138.
258 Lederman & Hirsh, supra note 98, at 71-72.
259 For a brief explanation, see Kresge & Throndson, supra note 161, at 158.
260 Lederman & Hirsh, supra note 98, at 71.
261 Id.
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amount,262 with the parent's U.S. base period ratio representing
the parent's overall borrowing activity.263
The third and final step occurs only if an affiliated corpo-
rate group contains both excess related group indebtedness and
excess U.S. shareholder group indebtedness. In that case, a cal-
culation is made to determine the amount of the parent's inter-
est expense that is allocated directly to the group's foreign
source income. The allocable related group indebtedness of the
U.S. parent, which is the lesser of ERGI or ESI, is divided by
the aggregate amount of related group indebtedness. This ratio
then is multiplied by the total amount of interest income re-
ceived by the U.S. parent on related group indebtedness.
Thereafter the allocated interest is apportioned among the sep-
arate foreign tax credit limitation baskets.
The rule is applicable only where a U.S. corporation has
both excess related group debt and excess U.S. shareholder
debt.2 64 Also, the netting rule is not applicable when a U.S. par-
ent, in acquiring a foreign target to a shareholder level that re-
sults in CFC status, re-computes both foreign base and U.S.
base period ratios in order to treat the target as if it had been a
member of the parent for the base years as well as for the entire
year in which the acquisition was made.265
Interest expense allocation and apportionment rules for
corporate foreign partnerships depend on the ownership inter-
est involved. If the U.S. corporate partner holds a 10% interest
in a foreign joint venture, interest apportionment occurs
through the asset based scheme. 266 If the partner is the U.S.
parent of a MNC, then the apportionment of the group's inter-
est expense will include the parent's pro rata share of the joint
venture's interest expense.26 7 The pro rata asset share is val-
ued by the tax book value without reference to the partnership's
earnings. 268 Interest is then apportioned according to the affili-
262 Lederman & Hirsh, supra note 98, at 72-73.
263 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.86110T(e)(1).
264 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.86110T(e)(9)(iv).
265 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.8619T(e)(2).
266 Id.
267 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.8619T(e)(2).
268 Temp. Treas. Reg.. § 1.86111T.
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ated corporate groupings under § 864(e)(1) and the
regulations. 269
4. Summary of Interest Expense Changes
The modified 'fungibility' rationale and the introduction of
§ 864(e) have, with the exception of three narrow instances,
eliminated the direct allocation of interest expense to a single
class of income. Instead interest expense within the affiliated
groups now attaches to foreignsource income and domestic
source income regardless of how the loan proceeds were ex-
pended. The new scheme gives interest deductions which are
not needed for U.S. tax purposes and which cannot be used for
foreign tax purposes. Likewise in disaggregating the parent's
interest deduction among its interestpaying foreign subsidiar-
ies, the CFC netting rule monitors both the inter-company bor-
rowing of related CFCs and the parent's domestic lending
activity. In so doing, it "discourages U.S. shareholders from
borrowing and re-lending funds to [CFCs] to achieve a substan-
tially more favorable allocation and apportionment of interest
expense for foreign tax credit limit purposes than would have
been achieved if the foreign corporations had directly borrowed
the funds."270
The new interest expense rules have been roundly criti-
cized since their enactment, in part for "ignor[ing] the fact that
foreign subsidiaries borrow for themselves."271 Indeed proposed
reforms center on the inclusion in the apportionment fractions
of the interest expense and assets of non-U.S. entities within
269 Id.
270 Interim Report, supra note 193, at 380; see also Wilensky, supra note 79,
at 1006.
271 On May 27, 1992, Chairman Dan Rostenkowski and member Willis Gra-
dion of the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representative introduced
the Foreign Income Tax Rationalization and Simplification Bill of 1992, H.R. 5270,
which would have amended the water's edge fungibility approach to interest ex-
pense allocations within affiliated groups to include the interest expense and as-
sets of foreign subsidiaries. Paul W. Oosterhuis, Recent and Pending Foreign Tax
Legislation, 338 P. L. I. Tax 7, at 7 (1993). It remains unlikely that this legisla-
tion or an offshoot thereof, will be 'revived' the during 1994-95 legislative sessions.
John Turro, United States, 8 Tax Notes Int'l 97, at 97 (January 10, 1994).
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the affiliated group.272 The main planning implications arising
from these changes are noted below.
E. Impacts on Multinational Corporate Strategy
These changes profoundly altered the longterm planning
considerations of U.S. MNCs. Whereas deferral of foreign-
source income was once an integral part of overseas business
planning, the same strategy may now cause a greater portion of
foreign tax credits to expire unused.273 Additionally, the strat-
egy of developing overseas investments which produced
lowtaxed foreign sourceincome to soak up excess foreign tax
credits has been rendered obsolete by the separate limitation
baskets.274
The number of planning options available to U.S. parents
under the new interest expense rules is limited. Shifting entire
operations that produce active basket income from a hightax ju-
risdiction to a lowtax jurisdictions will reduce the excess credit
problem 275 but appears to be an impractical option for most
U.S. manufacturing MNCs. Perhaps a more realistic strategy is
to increase the amount of deductions attributable to domestic
source income276 while at the same time restructuring income
producing activities to avoid generating unusable foreign tax
credits.277 Since fewer credits are gained when the gross taxa-
ble incomes in the host countries are reduced by deductions, in-
terest expense represents a valuable planning tool in that a
U.S. parent may at least lower its foreign tax liabilities.
278
Hence the importance of using debtbased acquisitions to fi-
nance international operations. Since the use of domestic
thirdparty finance will result in a portion of the interest ex-
pense being allocated to the parent corporation's foreign source
income, it is essential that the target finance a portion of the
acquisition cost. If the foreign target secures a loan locally and
then purchases assets in order to complete the U.S. parent's ac-
272 Foreign tax credits can be carried back three years or forward two years
under § 904(c).
273 Lemein & Novack, supra note 71, at 845.
274 Larkins, supra note 148, at 645.
275 Doernberg, supra note 225, at 86.
276 Friedman, supra note 112, at 23.
277 Andrus 1992, supra note 143 at 10181020.
278 Wilensky, supra note 79, at 1006.
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quisition, the affiliate charges interest on the loan against its
local taxable income. The same interest expense reduces the
amount of gross foreign source income prior to repatriation,
thus lowering the amount of foreign tax credits generated.2 7 9
These loans also reduce the subsidiary's unremitted earnings
which would otherwise increase the value of the parent's foreign
assets for apportionment purposes.280
A far different result occurs when the subsidiary's working
capital requirements are funded by inter-company loans. Be-
cause loans to foreign subsidiaries increase the value of the par-
ent's foreign assets, their continued use will gradually increase
the amount of interest expense allocable to foreign source in-
come by virtue of increasing incomeproducing foreign assets. 281
The parent is deemed to have made a loan at an arm's length
interest rate282 and a portion of that interest expense will be
allocated to foreign source income where the local affiliate will
not be able to use it as deduction. 28 3 If the foreign subsidiary is
not a CFC and the U.S. parent holds excess foreign tax credits,
then the interest income received from the subsidiary is deemed
to be passive basket income, thus fully taxable to the U.S.
parent.28 4
If instead the non-controlled subsidiary retains the earn-
ings and profits, a greater portion of the U.S. parent's interest
expense will be apportioned to foreign source income due to the
increased value of the foreign assets, lowering the foreign tax
credit limitation.28 5 The amount of foreign tax credits generated
is lower because the income remitted to the parent has been
reduced by the interest deductions in the host country. Since
the tax basis of a noncontrolled subsidiary is increased by un-
distributed earnings and profits, the interest payments also re-
duce the amount of earnings and profits that may remain with
the affiliate.
Likewise, the CFC netting rule not only increases the
amount of taxable passive basket income that remains unpro-
279 Andrus et al., supra note 126, at 687.
280 Friedman, supra note 112, at 25.
281 Treas. Reg. § 1.4822(a)(1) and (2) (1986).
282 Leonard, supra note 12, at 497.
283 Friedman, supra note 112, at 25.
24 Id.
285 Andrus 1992 supra note 143, at 1128.
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tected by foreign tax credits but, more fundamentally, allocates
greater amounts of interest expense to foreign source income. 28 6
In that respect, its effect mirrors that of the assetbased alloca-
tion scheme of § 864(e). If the CFC earns passive basket income,
it must allocate interest expense on its inter-company debt
against passive basket income in an amount equal to its passive
basket income. 287 This means that the interest income received
by a U.S. parent will be passive to the extent that the CFC
earns passive basket income. The amount of interest expense
paid by the CFC to the parent that exceeds the CFC's passive
income account is then placed into the general limitation bas-
ket, which is likely to have excess credits to begin with.
Given these planning considerations, the financing struc-
ture of overseas affiliates demand constant monitoring in order
to maintain acceptable tax costs. The following section com-
pares these provisions with relevant interest expense provisions
British, German and Japanese MNCs encounter in their respec-
tive tax systems.
F. Comparisons with Britain, Germany and Japan
Four countries the United States, Great Britain, Germany
and Japan form the world's leading capital exporters 288 and
competition among them for emerging markets in developing
economies has in recent years led to a greater emphasis on. non-
traditional forms of foreign business arrangements, 28 9 espe-
cially 'joint ventures, licensing, franchising and turnkey
projects.' 290 Indeed, the tremendous spate of international
mergers and acquisitions during the 1980s evinces the signifi-
cance strategic investment planning has within multinational
corporations. 291
286 Treas. Reg. 1.9045(c)(2)(iiXC).
287 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, INTERNATIONAL DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE NEW ECO-
NOMIC ENVIRONMENT (1989).
288 See generally CHARLES OMAN, NEW FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, (1984).
289 TIMO VIHERKENTTA, TAX INCENTIVES IN DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, 11 (1991). For concise definitions of
these terms, see Daniels, supra note 6, at 563.
290 Weston et al., supra note 103, at 42039.
291 Income and Corporation Taxes Act ("ICTA") 1988, § 8.
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Given these impacts, the following section briefly looks at
how interest expense among resident multinationals is handled
in Great Britain, Germany and Japan. All of the points herein,
except for a few, were drawn from secondary sources and are
provided merely to indicate the complexity of the TRA 1986 re-
forms relative to the main interest expense provisions in these
countries.
1. Great Britain
Resident corporations are taxed on their worldwide in-
come,292 with residency status being determined by place of in-
corporation.293 Such corporations are required to declare
income from their foreign subsidiaries only when the dividends
or interest income have been repatriated.294 Interest expense is
a permitted deduction which can be set against gross income.295
The entire interest expense is deductible, regardless of how the
expense is allocated. 296 This rule includes indebtedness in-
curred in acquiring a foreign corporation.297 The MNC's inter-
est expense is not allocated to foreign source income. 29s
The foreign affiliates of British corporations generally may
not deduct interest unless it is either from a bank operating in
the United Kingdom or it is a charge on income.299 In terms of
the latter, "the interest must be paid out of the company's prof-
its, and made under a liability incurred for a valuable and suffi-
cient consideration."30 0 These conditions appear to be easily
met under most circumstances. Additionally, most British
double taxation treaties exempt parent corporations from tax on
interest payments made by foreign subsidiariesY° ' These trea-
292 Viherkenttd, supra note 24, at 47.
293 J.A. KAY & MA. KING, THE BRITISH TAX SYSTEM, 179 (4th ed., 1986)
(hereinafter "Kay & King").
294 I.C.T.A 1970, 233(2)(dXiv).
295 ViherkenttA, supra note 24, at 91.
296 Eric Tomsett, Tax Consequences of international acquisitions and business
combinations: United Kingdom, 77b C.D. Fisc. Int'l 581, 592-93 (hereinafter
"Tomsett").
297 PRICE WATERHOUSE, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FOR A
GLOBAL ECONOMY, 19 (1991Xhereinafter "Price Waterhouse 1991").
298 Elliott, infra note 305, at 222.
299 Id.
300 Id. at 218-19.
301 DAVID R. DAVIES, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXA-
TION RELIEF, 155 (1985).
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ties usually set ceilings on the amount of withholding tax im-
posed by the contracting country on related party interest
payments.30 2
Because of these rules, the British tax system is thought to
favor the use of debt financing as opposed to equity financing in
both domestic and international acquisitions. 30 3 As the tax cost
of unrelated borrowing is often less than the yield on invest-
ment, "the rate of return on shareholders' funds is increased by
this use of external finance."30 4 Although special rules for CFCs
regarding foreign income and foreign tax credits exist, the In-
land Revenue Commission has yet to enact an equivalent to the
CFC netting rule.30 5
While the handling of interest expense in the British tax
system is perhaps as equally complex as it is in the United
States,306 the flexibility of its regulations pertaining to interest
and the wide coverage in British tax treaties indicate that inter-
est expense is an area where British MNCs enjoy a distinct ad-
vantage over their American counterparts.
2. Germany
The Federal Republic of Germany taxes30 7 the worldwide
income of its resident corporations, 308 with residency deter-
mined by the place of management test. 30 9 Under 'a complex
exemption/credit system concerning the treatment of dividends
received from foreign corporations' 310 dividends received by res-
ident parent corporations from their foreign subsidiaries gener-
302 Kay & King, supra note 293, at 165.
303 Id.
304 See generally BRIAN J. ARNOLD, THE TAXATION OF CONTROLLED
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON, 311-346
(1986)(hereinafter "Arnold").
305 Peter Elliott, United Kingdom, in DIFFERENCES IN TAX TREATMENT
OF FOREIGN INVESTORS: DOMESTIC SUBSIDIARIES AND DOMESTIC
BRANCHES, 222 (J. Forry, ed., 1984)(hereinafter "Elliott").
306 For a general survey of German taxation, see H.J. AULT & A.J. RADLER,
THE GERMAN CORPORATION TAX LAW WITH 1980 AMENDMENTS (2d ed.,
1981).
307 Korperschaftssteuergesetz (Corporation Tax Law hereinafter "KStG") § 1
(2) (1984).
308 Abgabenordnung (Fiscal Code) § 10 (1983).
309 Arnold, supra note 24, at 229.
310 Viherkentti, supra note 24, at 46.
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ally escape German taxation 311 if the German parent holds a
25% stake in the subsidiary. 312 Also, a tax sparing provision
under the K6rperschaftsteuerreformgesetz ("KStG") exempts
German foreign subsidiaries operating in developing countries
from German tax on repatriating dividends. 313
For most corporate income tax purposes, interest expense is
deductible, with no minimum equity required to determine de-
ductibility.314 A resident corporation can deduct the interest it
pays on loans secured in Germany and which proceeds were
sent abroad.315 Interest deductions arising from an inter-com-
pany loan in which the parent does not own 10% equity capital
in the debtor company will trigger passive income rules. 31 6
Such interest income is deemed to be passive income 317 unless
the corporation demonstrates that "funds are borrowed exclu-
sively on foreign capital markets and loaned on a longterm ba-
sis to businesses or permanent establishments located outside
Germany whose gross revenue is derived exclusively or almost
exclusively from active businesses as described above."3 1 Addi-
tionally, inter-company loans must be at an arm's length inter-
est rate.319
In short, German interest expense rules, while quite com-
plex,32 0 appear to provide more flexibility in the treatment of
311 Friedrich Landwehrmann, Legislative Development of International Corpo-
rate Taxation in Germany: Lessons for and from the United States, 15 Harv. Int'l
L. J., 238, at 244 (1974).
312 KStG § 26(3), 1984 Bundesgesetzblatt. Eligible countries are listed in
EntwicklungslanderSteuergesetz (the Developing Countries Tax Act).
313 DELOITTE, TOUCHE INTERNATIONAL, TAXATION IN EUROPE, 127
(1990).
314 Price Waterhouse, supra note 297, at 20.
315 Deloitte, Touche International , supra note 313, at 127.
316 Aussensteuergesetz ("AStG"), § 8(1)(7).
317 Arnold, supra note 24, at 253.
318 D. Kevin Dolan, International Strategies for Corporate Acquisitions, Dispo-
sitions, Financing, Joint Ventures, Reorganizations, and Restructurings, 333 PLI/
Tax 341, available in WESTLAW, TXTP Library.
319 For a discussion of interest expense regulations in international acquisi-
tions, see Wilhelm Haarmann, Steuerliche Folgen des grenziberschreitenden
Erwerbs oder Zusammenschlusses von Unternehmen, 77b C.D. Fisc. Int'l 297 (here-
inafter -Haarmann").
320 For a general survey of Japanese taxation, see Y. GOMI, GUIDE TO JAPA-
NESE TAXES 198990 (1989); see also H. ISHI, THE JAPANESE TAX SYSTEM
(1989).
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interest deductions within large corporate groups than U.S. tax
law.
3. Japan
Under the Japanese tax system,321 resident corporations
are taxed on their worldwide income,322 with corporate resi-
dency determined by the location of the principal office. 323 Tax
credit provisions enable resident corporations to eliminate or
reduce the incidence of double taxation.324
Interest expense incurred as "necessary expenses" are fully
deductible3 25 and allocable among related corporations on the
basis of assets.326 Hence the Japanese employ a rule similar to
§ 864(e). For acquisition indebtedness, the tax treatment di-
vides according to the purchase shares of a foreign corporation,
which is not deductible, and cash purchases of assets, which is
fully deductible. 327 Since all interest income received by resi-
dent corporations is taxable, taxes paid with respect to such in-
come are fully creditable and are not subject to percountry or
baskets limitations. 328
Overall, the Japanese interest expense rules appear, under
the guise of employing malleable concepts like "necessary ex-
penses," to afford sufficient flexibility to enable resident MNCs
to avoid significant tax penalties in financing overseas acquisi-
tions.329 If that is case, then once again the U.S. interest ex-
pense rules place U.S. multinationals at a competitive
disadvantage.
321 Corporation Tax Law , articles 4(1) and 5 (hereinafter "CTL"). See Arnold,
supra note 24, at 267.
322 CTL, art. 2(3).
323 For an interesting comparative inquiry, see Joel Slemrod, Competitive Ad-
vantage and the Optimal Tax Treatment of the ForeignSource Income of Multina-
tionals: The Case of the U.S. and Japan, 9 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 113, 127130 (no. 1,
1991)(hereinafter "Slemrod").
324 DELOITTE, HASKINS, & SELLS, TAXATION IN JAPAN, 31 (1981).
325 Id. at 132.
326 Yuko Miyazaki, Tax Consequences of international acquisitions and busi-
ness combinations: Japan, 77B C. D. Fisc. Int'l 361, 379 (hereinafter "Miyazaki").
327 Id. at 50.
328 Slemrod,'supra note 323, at 130.
329 Hammer & Riemer, supra note 144, at 5.
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G. Summary of Part H
The lowering of the corporate tax rate began a process
wherein most U.S. manufacturing MNCs now hold excess for-
eign tax credits each year. This position is chronic in that the
additional foreign tax credit limitation baskets virtually elimi-
nate the parent's ability to generate 'lowtaxed foreign source in-
come of one type that can be combined with hightaxed foreign
source income of another type.' 33 0 Compounding these restric-
tions are a set of the new interest expense allocation rules
which reduce the amount of foreign tax credits needed to cover
the amount of gross foreign source income. 33 1
As a result, most U.S. manufacturing MNCs need to mini-
mize the amount of taxes their foreign affiliates pay.332 Plac-
ing debt on foreign affiliates is one way to do so, although the
interest expense allocation schemes of TRA 1986 certainly com-
plicate this task. Corporate financial managers must closely
evaluate the U.S. parent's foreign tax credit position and the
degree of leverage of and its ownership interest in all of its for-
eign businesses before organizing any debtbased acquisition. 333
With respect to debtbased transactions, it appears U.S.
MNCs incur higher tax costs in acquiring or expanding overseas
businesses than their British, German and Japanese competi-
tors. The wide array of tax treaties in the British system and
relatively flexible interest expense rules permit British MNCs
to either wholly avoid or substantially lessen the incidence of
double taxation. Even the equally complex German credit and
exemption system appears to afford a wider range of planning
alternatives for German MNCs than what most U.S. MNCs can
carve out of the confines of TRA 1986 and subsequent regula-
tions. Although Japan implements a similar interest expense
scheme, there is more flexibility in international acquisitions
than what is provided by the I.R.C.
If these propositions ring true, then the interest expense
scheme arising from TRA 1986 renders U.S. MNCs less compet-
itive in international markets irrespective of where specific in-
vestments are made. The question posed here is whether the
330 Andrus et al., supra note 126, at 685.
331 Id.
332 Friedman, supra note 112, at 47.
333 Davies, supra note 301, at 26.
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unique conditions of a particular investment climate the cur-
rent corporate return to South Africa turns this disadvantage
into an incident where American MNCs are doubly burdened.
PART III. U.S. CORPORATE RETURN TO SOUTH AFRICA: NEW
DYNAmics
As noted earlier, most investment decisions for MNCs flow
from an articulated business strategy. Selecting the type of fi-
nancing structure that best serves the working capital needs of
a particular overseas operation requires a look at the relative
compatibility between U.S. tax law and the investment and tax
regulations of the host country.334
Part III places these considerations in view of the corpo-
rate return to South Africa. The first section reviews the types
of sanctions these four countries enacted during the 1980s while
the second discusses the divestiture patterns that formed in re-
sponse to these measures. Due to the severity of U.S. sanctions
and the scope of the American corporate withdrawal from South
Africa, most U.S. manufacturing MNCs interested in returning
there face market disadvantages. It is argued here that these
disadvantages are magnified by the basic incompatibility be-
tween South Africa investment regulations and the new U.S.
interest expense rules.
A. Overview
Historically South Africa has relied heavily on Great Brit-
ain, the Netherlands, Germany and the United States for in-
33 Inflows of foreign investment in mining industries in the last two decades of
the 19th century formed the foundation for many of the political & economic rela-
tionships that developed between South Africa and Western countries. Significant
nonmining investments began in the 1930s and continued through the 1960s. AL-
LISON COOPER & MICHELINE TUSENIUS, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
IN SOUTH AFRICA, at 910 (1987) (hereinafter "Cooper & Tusenius"); C. M. Rog-
erson, Multinational Corporations in Southern Africa, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, 197220 (M. Taylor & N. Thrift, eds., 1982);
and G. A. Muller, Multinational Companies in South Africa, SOUTH AFRICA IN
THE WORLD ECONOMY, 20735 (J. Matthews, ed., 1983). For radical perspec-
tives on foreign investment in the region, see generally ANN SEIDMAN & NEVA
SEIDMAN MAKGETKA, OUTPOSTS OF MONOPOLY CAPITALISM: SOUTH-
ERN AFRICA IN THE CHANGING GLOBAL ECONOMY, (1980); RUTH FIRST,
JONATHAN STEELE & CHRISTABEL GURNEY, THE SOUTH AFRICAN CON-
NECTION: WESTERN INVESTMENT IN APARTHEID, (1974).
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flows of foreign investment and trade.335 As South Africa's
manufacturing base developed rapidly after the Second World
War,336 many U.S. MNCs assumed preeminent roles in various
industries, including hightech electronics 3 37 and military equip-
ment.338 By 1970, South Africa's trade relationships had diver-
sified, due in part to a tremendous spate of investment from the
world's largest MNCs 339 and an everwidening network of bilat-
eral tax treaties. 340 The United States became South Africa's
top trading partner in 1979,341 more than thirty years after the
U.S. entered a double taxation treaty with South Africa. 342By
335 For a historical look at American investments in South Africa, see RICH-
ARD W. HULL, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN SOUTH AFRICA: HISTORICAL
DIMENSIONS OF ENGAGEMENT AND DISENGAGEMENT, (1990); VIC
RAZIS, THE AMERICAN CONNECTION, (1986); DESAIX MYERS, U.S. BUSI-
NESS IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND MORAL IS-
SUES, (1980); ANN SEIDMAN AND NEVA SEIDMAN, SOUTH AFRICA AND
U.S. MULTINATIONALS, (1977); DONALD MCHENRY, UNITED STATES
FIRMS IN SOUTH AFRICA, (1975).
336 See M. SISULU, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS INVOLVEMENT
IN SOUTH AFRICA'S ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY, (1985); RICHARD LEO-
NARD, COMPUTERS IN SOUTH AFRICA: A SURVEY OF U.S. COMPANIES,
(1978).
337 See ALLAN METTEN & PAUL GOODISON, FIGHTING FOR
APARTHEID: A JOB FOR LIFE (1988).
338 In fact the growth rate of South African economy was among the highest in
the world during the 1960s. Africa South of the Sahara, supra note 24, at 806.
339 Income and double taxation treaties include: FRANCE REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH AFRICA DOUBLE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM THE OPERATION
OF SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT, IN NOTES SIGNED OCTOBER 5 AND NOVEM-
BER 22, 1954; SWEDEN UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA INCOME TAX TREATY,
SIGNED JULY 28, 1955; CANADA SOUTH AFRICA INCOME TAX AGREE-
MENT, SIGNED SEPTEMBER 28, 1956; UNITED KINGDOM SOUTH AFRICA
INCOME TAX TREATY, SIGNED MAY 28, 1962; NETHERLANDS SOUTH AF-
RICA INCOME TAX TREATY AND PROTOCOL SIGNED MARCH 15, 1971;
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA IN-
COME TAX AGREEMENT AND EXCHANGE OF NOTES, SIGNED JANUARY
25, 1973.
340 JAMES BARBER & JOHN BARRATT, SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POL-
ICY 275 (1990)(hereinafter "Barber & Barrat").
341 A double taxation treaty was established in July 1946. CONVENTION BE-
TWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA FOR THE AVOID-
ANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND FOR ESTABLISHING RULES OF RECIP-
ROCAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON
INCOME, signed Dec 13, 1946 effective July 1, 1946
342 South Africa's strategic value to the West increased after Marxist govern-
ments assumed power in neighboring Mozambique and in Angola during 1970s.
Thereafter, the possibility of direct Soviet military intervention in either of these
50http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol6/iss2/5
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then two decades of Cold War politics in southern Africa 343 had
inextricably linked the economic significance of American pri-
vate investments in South Africa to U.S. foreign policy concerns
regarding access to the country's strategic minerals and the se-
curity of the 'oil route' around Cape of Good Hope.344
However, South Africa's economic significance to the
United States should not be overstated. Thus in 1981 when
U.S. foreign direct investment in South Africa peaked at $2.6
billion in 1981, 34 5 that sum represented less than 2% of world-
wide U.S. foreign direct investment.346 Excluding mining in-
vestments, South African markets generally accounted for only
a small fraction of the worldwide income for most American
MNCs operating there. For example, even at the height of its
presanctions business, the South African subsidiaries of Good-
year 347 and IBM3 48 contributed less than a one percent of the
parent's worldwide earnings or sales, respectively.
Significant change in the foreign relations between South
African and Western countries occurred with the rise of anti-
apartheid causes in Europe and North America in the 1970s,
with these local and national groups crystallizing into a truly
countries presumably posed a threat to the passage of oil shipments around the
Cape of Good Hope. However, the Soviets never established a military base in
Mozambique, nor did the Soviets follow the lead of its Cuban allies in sending
military troops into Angola. See ROBERT LEGVOLD, The Soviet Threat to South-
ern Africa, in SOUTH AFRICA & ITS NEIGHBORS (R. Rotberg, ed., 1985).
343 See Barber & Barrat, supra note 340, at 45-62, 151-172, 225-244.
344 Robin Bulman, ANC Seeks to Open S. Africa to Competition, Investment, J.
Com. & Com., Oct. 1, 1993, at 3A. However, Seidman claims that'total U.S. finan-
cial involvement in South African including direct investment, bank loans and
stockholdings, reached $14.6 billion' by 1983. ANN SEIDMAN, THE ROOTS OF
CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, 41 (1985).
345 STEPHEN LEWIS, THE ECONOMICS OF APARTHEID, 73 (1990). In
1974, British investments in South Africa constituted 1.2% of Britain's total world
investment whereas the percentages for the U.S. and West Germany were 1.2 and
0.9, respectively. THOMAS CALLAGHY, SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AF-
RICA, 111 (1982), citing J.E. SPENCE, SOUTH AFRICA, THE WORLD POWERS
AND SOUTHERN AFRICA (1980).
346 Flex Kessler, Goodyear Toughs It Out, Fortune, Sept. 30, 1985, at 24 (here-
inafter "Kessler").
347 Rosalind Rachid, Pullouts to hit S.Africa hard psychologically, J. Com., Oct.
22, 1986, at IA.
348 See generally Seizing the Moment: the Free South Africa Movement, Wash.
Rpt. on Afr., 1 Winter/Spring 1985.
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international movement within a decade. 349 By 1984 South Af-
rica had become a salient foreign policy issue in most Western
countries, as the 'apartheid problem' was no longer a question of
whether sanctions should be imposed but rather an issue of
when and how those measures would be taken.350
Thus the "politicization of business" in South Africa led in
part to the imposition of a wide range of bilateral and multilat-
eral economic sanctions against South Africa between 1984 and
1988. 35 1 While the history of sanctions need not be retraced
here,35 2 the following section highlights the main features of the
sanctions Britain, Germany, Japan and the U.S. imposed on
South Africa during the 1980s and notes the general pattern of
corporate responses to the antiapartheid movement.
B. Economic Sanctions Against South Africa
The history of economic and other sanctions against South
Africa exhibits a mix of coercion and accommodation.353
Although Western countries began registering official protests
against apartheid in the United Nations ("U.N.") in the
1950s, 3 5 4 the first series of U.N. Security Council sanctions
349 To some observers, only a substantial economic presence in the South Af-
rica economy empowered U.S. foreign policy with the type of leverage that was
needed to guide South Africa into an era of orderly, peaceful social change. Oppos-
ing arguments emphasized how U.S. economic ties perpetuated apartheid and that
only the withdrawal of investments would force meaningful political reform there.
For a diverse sampling of contemporary commentary on the issue, see SOUTH
AFRICA: APARTHEID AND DIVESTITURE (S. Anzovin, ed., 1987).
350 See generally KRIS W. KOBACH, POLITICAL CAPITAL: THE MOTIVES,
TACTICS & GOALS OF POLITICIZED BUSINESSES IN SOUTH AFRICA
(1990).
351 See generally Nathan E. Fagre & Catherine Casey, Use of Economic sanc-
tions to promote Human Rights: the Case of Economic Sanctions Against South
Africa, C399 ALI/ABA 165, 195 (1989); MERLE LIPTON, SANCTIONS AND
SOUTH AFRICA: THE DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC ISOLATION, (1988); JO-
SEPH HANLON & ROGER OMOND, THE SANCTIONS HANDBOOK (1987); IN-
TERNATIONAL ECONOMICS SEMINAR, SOUTH AFRICA: MYTHS AND
REALITIES OF DIVESTITURE (1985).
352 See generally R. MOORSOM, SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA,
(1986); D.G. CLARKE, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA, (1981).
353 See EVAN LUARD, 2 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 110-119
(1989); see also SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA (R. Segal ed., 1964).
354 The issue of sanctions intensified after the Sharpeville Massarce in March
1960 where South African police fired on protestors peacefully demonstrating
against pass laws. For a discussion of the events leading up to, during and after
the shootings at Sharpeville, see AMBROSE REEVES, SHOOTING AT
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol6/iss2/5
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were not enacted until the 1960s. 355 Bilateral measures fol-
lowed thereafter, with the U.S. blocking International Mone-
tary Fund (I.M.F.) lending to South Africa 356 and Japan
banning all new direct investments in 1968.35 7 A second wave
of bilateral358 and multilateral 359 sanctions were enacted after
the 1976 Soweto riots. 36 0
Antiapartheid movements in Europe and North America
emerged apposite diplomatic channels, organizing consumer
boycotts and publicity campaigns to force the withdrawal of for-
eign corporations operating in South Africa.361 In the United
States,36 2 antiapartheid campaigns prompted some corpora-
tions to 'camouflage' their South African business ties363 and led
to the 1977 drafting of the Sullivan principles3 64 which estab-
SHARPEVILLE: THE AGONY OF SOUTH AFRICA (1960). A voluntary arms ex-
port embargo was adopted in 1963. U.N. SCOR 181, 18 U.N. SCOR Res. and Decs.
at 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/18/Rev. (1963); see generally AMELIA C. LEISS,
APARTHEID AND U.N. COLLECTIVE MEASURES: AN ANALYSIS, (1965). The
embargo was extended in 1970 under Resolution 282. Margaret Doxey, Interna-
tional Sanctions: A Framework for Analysis with Special Reference to the U.N. and
South Africa, 26 Intl Org. 527 (1972).
355 Doxey, supra note 354, at 530.
356 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, FINANCIAL SANCTIONS
AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, 52 (1991)(hereinafter "Financial Sanctions Against
South Africa").
357 Great Britain ended North Sea oil exports to South Africa in 1977. Cooper
& Tusenius, supra note 334, at 17; Lipton, supra note 351, at 16.
358 U.N. SCOR 418, 32 U.N. Scor Res. and Decs. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/33
(1977).
359 Riots in SOWETO, a black township near Johannesburg, began in June
and continued through December of 1976. In 1977, the U.N. Security Council ele-
vated the arms embargo to mandatory status.
360 John Nielsen, Time to quit South Africa? Fortune, Sept. 30, 1985, at 1823.
361 See generally JANICE LOVE, THE U.S. ANTIAPARTHEID MOVEMENT:
LOCAL ACTIVISM IN GLOBAL POLITICS (1985).
362 To lower their profile in South Africa, some corporations renamed their
products and funnelled their transactions through thirdcountry affiliates. See gen-
erally ELIZABETH SCHMIDT, DECODING CORPORATE CAMOUFLAGE: U.S.
BUSINESS SUPPORT FOR APARTHEID (1980).
363 Called the Sullivan Principles after its chief architect, Rev. Leon Sullivan,
these fair employment principles set forth a voluntary code of conduct for U.S.
corporations operating in South Africa. See Church Project on U.S. Investments in
South Africa (1977). Thereafter U.S. corporations operating there were annually
evaluated by the Arthur D. Little Co. Kessler, supra, at 24; see also Stratford
Sherman, Scoring Corporate Conduct in South Africa, Fortune July 9, 1984, at
168-172.
. 364 The hiring, training and promotion practices of American corporations in
South Africa came under greater scrutiny in the 1970s. See DESAIX MYERS,
405
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lished fair employment standards and ethical guidelines for
U.S. corporations operating in South Africa. 365 The movement
squarely confronted President Ronald Reagan's foreign policy of
'constructive engagement,' 366 which led the U.S. in the early
1980s to veto U.N. resolutions that would have imposed sanc-
tions against South Africa. 367 However, calls for international
economic sanctions and corporate divestment gained greater
amplitude in early 1984 after violence in South Africa's black
townships led to a state of emergency and bans on press cover-
age. 368 Although the United Nations never enacted mandatory
measures during this period,3 69 over seventy countries imposed
bilateral economic sanctions on South Africa during this
time. 370
1. Sanctions Compared
In the United States, the question of South African sanc-
tions reached all levels of government371 as eventually '27
states, 88 cities and 24 counties enacted laws or policies' which
penalized U.S. corporations for conducting business in South
LABOR PRACTICES OF U.S. CORPORATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA (1977). The
European Community set forth a similar ethical review. See James Barber, The
EEC Code of Conduct for South Africa: Capitalism as a Foreign Policy Instrument,
World Today, March 1980.
365 U.S. foreign policy emphasized a process of gradually increasing political
and economic pressure on the South African government to accept a moderate pace
of political reforms. For a concise discussion on the policy and its origins, see
Chester Crocker, South Africa: Strategy for Change, 59 Foreign Affairs, 323 (Win-
ter 1980-1981). Crocker was the Assistant Secretary of State of African Affairs
under the Reagan administration and chief architect of the policy. For a fuller dis-
cussion, see CHRISTOPHER COKER, THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AF-
RICA, 1968-1985: CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT AND ITS CRITIC (1986).
366 See Seidman, supra note 335, at 94-95.
367 See Barber & Barratt, supra note 340, at 303-308.
368 In February 1987, the U.S., West Germany and Britain vetoed a United
Nation Security Council Resolution which called for the implementation of
mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa even though the resolution
was modelled after the sanctions that were passed by the U.S. Congress less than
five months earlier. Afr. Econ. Dig., Feb. 28, 1987, at 17.
369 Aft. Bus., Nov. 1989, at 13.
370 For a discussion of the types of sanctions enacted, see Lyn Berat, Undoing
and redoing business in South Africa: the lifting of the Comprehensive
AntApartheid Act of 1986 and the continuing validity of state and local an-
tiapartheid legislation, 6 Conn. J. Int'l L. 7, at 14-22 (1990).
371 Richard Lawrence, S. African Trade Seen Edging Up As U.S. Lifts Ban, J.
Com. & Com., July 11, 1991, at LA.
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Africa. 372 Most state and local legislation followed the Septem-
ber 1986 enactment of the Comprehensive AntiApartheid Act
("Comprehensive Act"). 373 In overriding a presidential veto, 374
Congress imposed total bans on imports of South African ura-
nium, coal and textiles and on a wide range of exports, includ-
ing computers, petroleum products, and nuclear technology.
37 5
Public and private financial and investment restrictions also
were imposed, 376 the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) certifica-
tion was revoked 377 and the U.S.-South Africa double taxation
treaty was terminated.378 Repeal of the Comprehensive Act
was conditioned on a list of political reforms and events, includ-
ing the release of imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela.
37 9
A year later, Congress eliminated the foreign tax credit
election for income taxes, war profits, or excess profits paid in
South Africa. 38 0 This measure, known as the Rangel Amend-
372 22 U.S.C § 5001, Pub. L. No. 99440 (October 2, 1986).
Z73 Reagan vetoed the Comprehensive AntiApartheid Bill of 1986 (H.R. 4868)
claiming that the bill would 'seriously impede the prospects for a peaceful end to
apartheid.' However, in one of the few instances in which Congress overrode a
presidential veto during the Reagan administration, the House and Senate voted
313 to 83 and 84 to 14, respectively, to override the veto on September 29, 1986.
CCH Tax Day: Federal Sept. 30, 1986, F86273002. For a discussion of the forces
behind the 1986 sanctions legislations, see Winston Nagan, Economic Sanctions,
U.S. Foreign Policy, International Lawand the AntiApartheid Act of 1986, 4 Fla. J.
Int'l L. 85 (1988).
374 Aft. Econ. Dig. Oct. 11, 1986, at 54.
375 An exception was made for investments in companies wholly owned by
black South Africans. See Louis K. Rothberg, Sections 402 and 403 of the Compre-
hensive AntiApartheid Act of 1986, 22 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 117 (1989).
376 As of July 1, 1987, loss of FSC status meant U.S. corporations could no
longer benefit from the protection I.R.C. §§ 922 and 924 offer for U.S. exports.
377 The South AfricaUnited States Income Tax Convention, operative since
1946, was terminated on October 31, 1986 but due to a provision contained in the
treaty the termination did not become effective until six months after the abroga-
tion. Hence on July 1, 1987 the treaty officially terminated. Income Tax treaty
Between U.S. and South Africa to Terminate, CCH Tax Day Nov. 3, 1986, available
in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library.
378 Section 3 11(a) of the Comprehensive Act sets out the provisions and notifi-
cation requirement in addition to the five political reforms, which were 1) the re-
lease of all political prisoners; 2) repeal of the state of emergency; 3) ending the
ban on opposition political parties; 4) repeal specific laws; 5) enter good faith nego-
tiations with representatives of the black majority.
379 Congress enacted § 901(j)(2)(C)(i) to the I.R.C. subchapter N by amending
by § 10231 of the Revenue Act of 1987 (Pub. L No. 100203, 101 Stat. 1330382) on
12/22187.
380 The amendment derives its names from New York Congressman Charles
Rangel who introduced it. The amendment's legislative history is interesting as it
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ment,381 also required that the earnings of CFCs operating in
South Africa to be subject to subpart F treatment.382 Repeal of
these measures, which went in effect on January 1, 1988,383 was
also linked to the guidelines set by Comprehensive Act. 384
The termination of the double taxation treaty, the loss of
the foreign tax credit mechanism and the general inability to
export certain technologies wholly undermined the profitability
of most American operations in South Africa. In 1987 alone, the
loss of foreign tax credits totalled $56 million.385 Although
South Africa taxes were still deductible, the change exposed all
income producing investments to the full brunt of double taxa-
tion. Ironically, the federal measures made it impossible for
most U.S. MNCs to comply with sanctions imposed by other
countries and avoid the antiboycott provisions within the
I.R.C.386
The scale and punitive scope of these measures dwarf the
bilateral sanctions by Britain, Germany and Japan imple-
mented during the same period. In Britain, Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher steadfastly refused, against considerable
public and international pressure, to impose mandatory bilat-
eral economic sanctions on South Africa. 387 However, after the
was apparently a last minute' addon to a finance bill that was "adopted without
debate and reportedly without most Congressmen knowing about it." Barber &
Barratt, supra note 340, at 336.
381 I.R.C. § 901(i), as amended Section 10231 of the Revenue Act of 1987, effec-
tively subjects current income to be included in gross income. I.R.C. § 952(a)(5).
See Rev. Rul. 9053, 90 FED par. 46, 349. See also Tax Effects of the Repeal of Sanc-
tions Against South Africa, Tax Adviser, Nov. 1991, at 736.
382 In Rev. Rul. 8944, 19891, CB 237, the Service noted that § 901(j)(2)(C)(i)
became effective for taxable years after 12131/87.
383 The Rangel amendment was repealable only after the Secretary of Treas-
ury certified that South Africa has satisfied the requirements of Section 311(a) of
the Comprehensive Act.
384 Tony Koenderman, New tax burden may chase more U.S. firms from S. Af-
rica, J. Com. & Com., Jan. 26, 1988, at 3A.
385 See James P. Holder & William F. Brown, A Paradox: Why does the Federal
Tax Law Penalize United States Taxpayers Who Observe the Boycott of South Af-
rica by United States Allies, 42 Tax Law. 211 (1989).
388 Lipton, supra note 351.
387 On September 16, 1986, the EC enacted bans on new investment and on
imports of South African iron, steels and Kruggerrands. NEWAFRICAN YEAR-
BOOK 199394, 341 (9th ed, 1994)(hereinafter "NewAfrican Yearbook"); see gener-
ally MARTIN HOLLAND, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND SOUTH AFRICA
(1989)(hereinafter "Holland").
[Vol. 6:353
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European Economic Community (EEC) adopted a series of
mandatory trade sanctions for selected imports and exports,38 8
the British Parliament enacted voluntary trade sanctions and a
ban on new foreign investment.38 9 Likewise, despite a strong
antiapartheid movement in Germany,3 90 the German govern-
ment opposed mandatory sanctions at both bilateral and multi-
lateral levels391 and instead enacted a series of voluntary trade
and investment measures.3 92 In Japan, where a mandatory
ban on all direct investment in South Africa had been in effect
since 1968, 39 3 bans on Krugerrands imports and certain high
technology exports to certain departments within the South Af-
rican government were added in 1985s 94 with bans on iron and
steel imports395 and travel restrictions being imposed a year
later.396
In view of these differences in sanctions activity, it is not
surprising that the American corporate response to official and
public interest divestiture pressures took on far different
dimensions than the responses of British, German and Japa-
nese corporations to sanctions legislation enacted in their re-
spective countries, as noted below.
388 Holland, supra note 387, at 100-101.
389 During the 1988 national elections, allegations were made that the federal
government had actually sold submarines in recent years to South Africa in con-
travention of the U.N. arms embargo. Ar. Bus. Nov. 1988, at 9; see also U.N.
Centre on Transnat'l Corporations, Transnational Corporations in South Africa
and Namibia: United Nations Public Hearings, Vol. III: Statements and Submis-
sions, at 316-320, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/68, (1987Xhereinafter "Statements and
Submissions").
390 In 1986, the German government vetoed EC legislation which would have
placed a ban on South African coal imports. Lipton, supra note 351, at 29.
391 Several "restrictive" trade measures in July 1986, most of which centered
on sales of military equipment. Other voluntary measures were enacted in August
1987. Holland, supra note 347, at 101. For a list, see Statements and Submis-
sions, supra note , 250-251 (1987).
392 Cooper & Tusenius, supra note 334, at 16.
393 Id.
394 A.E. Cullison, Japan to review S. Africa Curbs? U.S. Sanctions may prompt
stiffer measures in future, J. Com., Oct. 6, 1986, at 22A_
395 Cooper & Tusenius, supra note 334, at 16.
396 Barbara Rudolph, What are the Americans Doing,? Time, Sept. 20, 1993, at
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2. Divestment Patterns
For most U.S. MNCs in South Africa during the 1980s, a
'complex network of local, state and federal sanctions' not only
undercut the profitability of their affiliated operations there but
also engrafted a perpetual public relations liability at their
home offices.3 9 7 Hence in the course of five years, the pressure
of antiapartheid groups and the punitive effects of local, state
and federal sanctions resulted in a massive withdrawal of
American businesses and investments from South Africa.
The withdrawal unfolded in waves of divestments that
were punctuated by several dramatic events. From 1984 to
mid1985, about sixty American companies withdrew from
South Africa, most of which held only nonequity interests and
all claiming their decisions were based on purely commercial
reasons.398 Then, in August 1985, following the refusal by the
U.S. to allow the International Monetary Fund to provide South
Africa financial assistance, South Africa's major commercial
creditors refused to the delay the rollover of $14 billion in
debt.399 Although the government negotiated a lastminute debt
standstill agreement, 400 the sanctions issue now fully engaged
the foreign policies of almost all Western countries. 401 In re-
sponding to the increased pressures, several MNCs substan-
tially raised their contributions to educational funds and other
philanthropic programs that benefited black South Africans 402
while others divested their interests, with Cooper Industries,40 3
Emery,40 4 and Dow Chemicals40 5 being among the first to cite
consumer pressure as a basis for their decisions.
397 Southern African Monitor, Afr. Econ. Dig., Oct. 4, 1986, at 17.
398 Charles Grant, The Banks Abandon South Africa, Euromoney, Dec. 1985,
at 68.
399 See generally JONATHAN LEAPE, SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN DEBT
AND THE STANDSTILL, 1985-1990 (1991).
400 Barber & Barratt, supra note 340, at 299-344.
401 For example, Coca Cola established a $10 million education fund that was
controlled by black South Africans. William H. Kaempfer et al., Divestment, in-
vestment sanctions, and disinvestment: an evaluation of antiapartheid policy in-
struments, 41 Int'l Org. 457, 473 (1987)(hereinafter "Kaempfer et al"). Similarly,
Goodyear spent $6 million on nonwhite educational and housing programs. Kess-
ler, supra note 346, at 24.
402 South Africa Watchdog, Afr. Bus. July 1986, at 10.
403 South Africa Watchdog, Afr. Bus. Sept. 1987, at 11.
404 South Africa Watchdog, Afr. Bus., Apr. 1987, at 9.
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Passage of the Comprehensive Act in September 1986
prompted a second flurry of divestments, with two of the most
prominent American corporations in South Africa, General Mo-
tors40 6 and IBM, 40 7 announcing divestment plans within a day
of each other. Then, after the Rangel Amendment was enacted
in December 1987, the final wave of divestitures occurred,
marked by the 1989 divestitures of the largest U.S. MNCs still
operating in South Africa, Mobile Oi4o8 and Goodyear. 40 9 Both
companies cited the loss of foreign tax credits as the incident
which foreclosed any possibility of maintaining profitable opera-
tions in South Africa while sanctions were in place.
410
Hence by 1990 the once formidable sea of U.S. investments
in South Africa had evaporated to a few isolated businesses con-
tinuing there despite the sanctions. 411 Most corporate inter-
ests were sold as quickly as possible to local enterprises, often
405 After sixty years in South Africa General Motors divested its operations
there in December 1986, sustaining a $50 million loss in the process. J. Com. &
Com. Feb. 27, 1989 at 1A. A few years earlier, GM issued a policy statement de-
fending its decision to remain in South Africa. See Statements and Submissions,
supra note 389, at 84-93. For a history of GM in South Africa, see ERIC ROSEN-
THAL, THE ROLLING YEARS: FIFTY YEARS OF GENERAL MOTORS IN
SOUTH AFRICA, (1982).
406 IBM, which sold its assets to local companies, began operations in South
Africa in 1952 and had reached $175 million in sales in 1985. Koenderman, S.
Africa disinvestment mounts U.S. corporate trend adds to whites' sense of isolation,
J. Com. & Com., Nov. 21, 1986, at 3A.
407 Mobil had been operating in South Africa for 90 years. Mobil Selling Its
South Africa Units for $155 Million, L.A. Times, Apr. 29, 1989, at 41. For a com-
pany history of its South African operations, see MOBIL OIL CORPORATION,
MOBIL OIL IN SOUTH AFRICA, (1972).
408 Afr. Bus., July, 1989, at 9; Goodyear plans to Leave South Africa, L.A.
Times, June 8, 1989, at 3. Goodyear sold tires in South Africa since 1916 and had
manufactured tires there since 1947. Kessler, supra note 346, at 24.
409 Southern Africa Monitor, Afr. Econ. Dig., May 8, 1989, at 14. When in April
1989 Mobil Oil Corporation sold all of its entire assets at less than half their book
value to the General Mining Union Corporation, a South African mining and in-
dustrial conglomerate, Mobil's chairman noted that the loss of foreign tax credits
resulted in $5 million loss in 1988 alone. Id. Likewise, Goodyear cited the same
reason in announcing the sale of its manufacturing subsidiary to an affiliate within
the Anglovaal family. Mobil agrees to sell assets to South Africa to GENCOR, J.
Com. & Com., May 1, 1989, at 7B.
410 Southern Africa Monitor, Afr. Econ. Dig., Feb. 28, 1987, at 17.
411 For example, Mobil recorded a net book loss of $140 million. Mobil Selling
Its South Africa Units for $155 Million, L.A. Times, Apr. 29, 1989, at 41.
1994]
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at substantial losses.412 Some corporations sold their subsidiar-
ies to a local holding company, as in the Firestone divest-
ment.413 Others, like Ford,414 Exxon415 and Cigna,416 divested
their assets and interests into trust funds.
Due to the comparative severity of U.S. sanctions, the pat-
tern of American divestitures contrasts sharply with those
formed by British, German and Japanese MNCs. Although the
value of British direct investment in South Africa fell from $11
billion to $5.4 billion between 1982 and 1988,417 only a handful
of British MNCs completely divested their holdings4 18 Instead,
most British companies, like the Delta Group 419 and ICI,420
simply became minority shareholders. Like many U.S. MNCs,
some British companies increased their philanthropic activi-
ties.421 Hence by mid1989 roughly half of the over 200 British
MNCs 422 still held majority shares of their South African sub-
sidiaries. 423 German corporations were perhaps the most resis-
tant to the international divestiture movement. Only ten
412 The parent corporation, Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, sold its 25%
stake in Firestone South Africa Limited to the majority shareholder, Federal Volk-
sbeleggins Beperk, a local industrial holding company. South Africa Watchdog,
Afr. Bus., Aug. 1987, at 7.
413 Ford Motor Company, in seeking to maintain its product line in South Af-
rica while reducing its profile there, placed its 42% interest in its South African
subsidiary worth $61 million in an employee trust account in exchange for "deb-
treduction and to keep the company in business through the next car production
cycle, which ends in 1994." Ford denies violation of antiapartheid law, J. Com. &
Com., Dec. 24, 1987, at 5A.
414 Southern Africa Monitor, Ar. Econ. Dig., Jan. 3, 1987, at 15.
415 Southern Africa Monitor, Ar. Econ. Dig., Dec. 4, 1987, at 17.
416 Number of UK Companies in S. Africa Falls, J. Com. & Com., Mar. 29,
1988, at 3A.
417 Fifty six British were known to have left South Africa during this period.
One of the largest British MNCs in South African to fully divest was Metal Box,
which sold its 25% stake in its subsidiary, Robor Industrial Holdings, to Barlow
Rand, for roughly $50 million. South Africa Watchdog, Afr. Bus., May, 1988, at 8.
The divestment of Standard Charter, one of South Africa's largest commercial
creditors, stood as one of the dramatic moments during the sanctions era. South
Africa Watchdog, Afr. Bus. June 1987, at 9.
418 South Africa Watchdog, Afr. Bus. Feb. 1987, at 7.
419 Southern Africa Monitor, Air. Econ. Dig., Jan. 15, 1988, at 25.
420 For example, British Petroleum spent over $44 million in establishing an
education and housing fund in Cape Town in 1986. Southern Africa Monitor, Afr.
Econ. Dig., Nov. 22, 1986: 15.
421 International Briefs, J. Com., Aug. 10, 1989, at 4A.
422 South Africa's Face of the Future, Mgmt Today, Sept. 1991, 68, at 71.
423 Financial Sanctions Against South Africa, supra note 359, at 53.
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German corporations withdrew from South Africa, 424 with
prominent German MNCs such as Siemens, Volkswagon, Linde,
AEG, and Daimler Benz choosing to stay.425
The pattern of Japanese divestitures also reflects a general
choice of reduced ownership over complete divestment. Since
most Japanese companies operated in South Africa through dis-
tribution arrangements,426 the departure of American and
European companies between 1985 and 1987 resulted in imme-
diate market share gains for their the licensed subsidiaries. 427
Thus in Japan became South Africa's largest trading part-
ner,428 prompting vigorous complaints in the U. N. General As-
sembly. 429 Thereafter, most Japanese MNCs simply limited
their business activities in South Africa. 430
Political reform eventually developed under the guidance of
Frederik W. de KIerk, who was elected President in August
1989. A few months after imprisoned ANC leader Nelson
Mandela was released in February 1990, the ban on political
opposition was lifted and some of the cornerstones of apartheid
society, including racial restrictions involving the purchase of
land, were abolished.431 In 1991 the ANC and other parties en-
tered direct negotiations with the de Klerk government over
constitutional change and the transition to majority rule.432
424 South Africa Watchdog, Afr. Bus. Sept. 1987, at 11.
425 Cooper & Tusenius, supra note 334, at 138144. In fact, Japan's major auto-
mobile manufacturers Honda, Isuzu, Mazda, Toyota and Yamaha all held distri-
bution agreements with local assembly companies. An exception was Mitsubishi
Corporation which one one of the few corporations which owned a branch office in
South Africa. Id.
426 For example, sales of Hitachi computer through its local distributor sharply
increased after IBM's divestment. South Africa Watchdog, Afr. Bus. Dec. 1987, at
9.
427 The increased trade resulted in part from the relative strength of the yen
visa vis the U.S. dollar. Id. It was an ironic development as well, in that the South
African ethnic identification system treated Japanese as 'honorary whites.' San-
ford J. Ungarad and Peter Vale, South Africa: Why Constructive Engagement
Failed, 64 Foreign Affairs 234 (1985/1986).
428 South Africa Watchdog, Afr. Bus., Dec. 1988, at 10.
429 For example, the Matsushita Electrial Industrial Company left the follow-
ing year. Matsushita to close South Africa unit, J. Com. & Com., Dec. 7, 1989, at
5A_
43 id.
431 Africa South of the Sahara, supra note 24, at 799-803.
432 Britain to lift ban on S. Africa, J. Com., Feb. 21, 1990, at 14A.
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The Mandelade Klerk dialogue prompted changes in the foreign
policies of the leading industrialized countries, as noted below.
3. Lifting of Sanctions
De Klerk's initial reform efforts soon gather international
support. Upon Mandela's release, Great Britain immediately
abolished its economic sanctions. 433 Thereafter the EEC re-
voked its trade bans434 while Japan lifted its trade bans in Oc-
tober 1991435 and eliminated all remaining sanctions a year
later.43
6
The dictates of U.S. foreign policy on removal of South Afri-
can sanctions required a incremental approach to be taken. In
June 1991, U.S. President George Bush abolished most of
trade, financial and investments bans and restored South Af-
rica's eligibility for export credits under the U.S. Export Import
Bank.4 37 Then, after the whitesonly referendum in March 1992
evinced public support for de Klerk's reforms, 438 the U.S. for-
eign tax credit election was reinstated. 439
Between 1991 and the end of 1993, numerous trade delega-
tions shuttled between Johannesburg and capitols throughout
the world. Although the trajectory of political reform there still
433 The foreign ministers voted to lift the sanctions on April 15, 1991. Southern
African Monitor, Afr. Econ. Dig., Apr. 22, 1991, at 11.
434 A.E. Cullison, Japan Lifts Most Trade Sanctions In Effort to Speed S. Africa
Reforms, J. Com., Oct. 23, 1991, at 4A.
435 Frank Ruddy, South Africa Opportunities and Uncertainties, Wash. Times,
Nov. 28, 1993, at B3.
436 Executive Order #12769.
437 In whitesonly referendum on March 17, 1992 paved the way towards mul-
tiparty negotiations over constitutional changes and the establishment of transi-
tional period to democratic rule. By February 1993, over 20 political parties
agreed to a new constitutional format. Africa South of the Sahara, supra note 24,
at 798.
438 As of July 10, 1992, the Internal Revenue Service eliminated South Africa
from the list of countries subject which are ineligible for foreign tax credits under
§ 901(j) but noted that the former income tax treaty would not resume operation.
Rev. Rul. 9263, 92 FED par. 46, at 433. The State Department determined that
South Africa satisfied the requirements of § 311(a) of the Comprehensive Act on
July 10, 1491. Hence taxes paid on income generated after that date became cred-
itable. Philip d. Morrison, United States: Taxes Paid to South Africa are now cred-
itable, explains Morrison, 4 Tax Notes Int'l 869 (Apr. 27, 1992).
439 Id.
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remained uncertain,440 new investments came from Singa-
pore44 1 and Taiwan,442 countries which previously had only in-
substantial economic ties with South Africa. In addition to the
firms which never left, British, 44s German 444 and Japanese 445
MNCs made began making initial inquiries into profitability of
returning to South Africa.
In contrast, most American corporations took more of a
"wait and see" attitude to the reforms in South Africa," 6 with
only a few companies making longterm investments." 7 None-
quity investments continued to be the path chosen by most U.S.
corporations in returning to South Africa.448 In fact, between
1991 and 1992 "only 28 American companies made new, direct
capital investments in South Africa"" 9 compared to over a hun-
440 Salil Tripathi, S.Africa keen on S'pore investments, says de Kierk, Bus.
Times, June 9, 1992, at 3.
441 For example, shortly after their government negotiated a tax treaty with
South Africa, several Taiwanese textile corporations established operations in the
impoverished areas once known as the 'independent homelands.' Joe Castro, S.
African Garment Industry Frayed; Asian Competition Batters Local Firms in
Homelands, J. Com. & Com., May 5, 1993, at 1A.
442 See T&B gains edge in South Africa, Intl Freighting Wkly., Sept. 14, 1992,
at 7; ICI widens interest in S. Africa, Independent, Oct. 14, 1993, at 36.
"3 German firm buys 51% stake in CME, Bus. Day, Jan. 24, 1991, at 1; Oper-
atives Standbein in Suedafrika, Europa Chemie, Aug. 5, 1991, at 14.
"4 Madza to buy into South Africa, Int'l Herald Trib., Oct. 17, 1991, at 17.
4"5 Gillian Findlay & Riccardo A. Davis, U.S. Marketers cautious on S. Africa,
Advertising Age, Oct. 25, 1993, at 58 (hereinafter "Findlay & Davis").
4" Corporations making their first investments in South Africa include Lotus
Development and CPS Chemical. Paula Green, U.S. Investors Take Indirect Path
in S. Africa, J. Com. & Com., June 26, 1992, at 1A.
"7 When full trading relations were restored South Africa, Proctor and Gam-
ble immediately entered into licensing and franchising agreements with local busi-
nesses. Protector & Gamble repurchased its former South African subsidiary. U.S.
States, Cities continue to lift economic sanctions against South Africa, BNA Intl
Trade Daily, Dec. 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNADNEWS.
Austin's International negotiated a franchising agreement in South Africa. Me-
linda Zisser, Austin's Signs 35Restaurant Franchise Deal with Republic of South
Africa, S. Fla. Bus. J., Aug, 13, 1993, at 9. Also, Hertz Corporation returned in
1993 under a new franchising arrangement. Hertz reenters South Africa; signs car
rental franchise agreement, PR Newswire, November 13, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, BUSALA File. Hertz divested all of its South African interests in
1987. South Africa Watchdog, Afr. Bus., Oct. 1987, at 6.
4" Rudolph, supra note 397, at 53.
"9 Philip Gawith, S. Africa investment up but so are the outflows: Divestment
and investments abroad amount to more than double inward inflows, Fin. Times
(London), Nov. 26, 1992, at 4.
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dred investments by non-U.S. entities. 450 Their reticence to
make equity investments there stemmed from both the con-
tinuity of federal, state, and local sanctions through 1992 and
the absence of a set of management policies451 deemed politi-
cally correct by the various interest groups 4 5 2 that scrupulously
monitor business practices in South Africa.453 Hence most of
the 250+ U.S. companies that were operating in South Africa by
the end of 1993 did so through distribution operations, 45 4 licens-
ing arrangements 455 or other limited contract agreements with
local partners.456
450 These concerns stemmed from the fact that 26 states, 90 cities and 23 mu-
nicipalities still maintained sanctions on South African investments by June 1993.
Charles Thurston, Business Gropes for Politically Correct S. Africa Stance, J. Com.
& Com., June 22, 1993, at 3A. Training programs for black South African execu-
tives have been conducted in the United States. Black South African Executives in
U.S. training program arrive in Washington for business and economic briefing, PR
Newswire, June 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BUSANL File. For a
discussion of the socially productive corporate practices in postaparthied South Af-
rica, see S. Prakash Sethi, Operational modes for multinational corporations in
postapartheid South Africa: a proposal for a code of affirmative action in the mar-
ketplace, 12 J. Bus. Ethics, 1 (1993). The importance of establishing acceptable
corporate practices is reflected in Digital Equipment Corporation's return to South
Africa in September 1993 in which it specifically aligned its subsidiary there with
the first blackowned computer company in South Africa. Country report, South
Africa, Economist Intelligence Rpt., no. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, BUSANL FILE.
451 Such groups include the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility, In-
vestor Responsibility Research Center, and American Committee on Africa. See
MNCs operating in South Africa still pressured to divest, Global Fin. Markets,
Feb. 12, 1992, available in WESTLAW, BUSINTL Database.
452 Maria Scott, South Africa: Ethics Men Take Stock of New South Africa, Ob-
server, Dec. 12, 1993, at 12. For a brief discussion on a mutual fund management
company that has investments in South Africa, see Is South Africa the next emerg-
ing market? Business Wire, Sept. 24, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BUSANL File.
453 Business in South Africa, Economist, Dec. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS;
Nexis Library, BUSANL File.
454 By early 1994 over 20 states, 9 counties and 30 cities had yet to repeal their
sanctions. U.S. states, cities continue to lift economic sanctions against South Af-
rica, Dec. 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNADNEWS File.
455 Paula Green Trade Talk Paula Green, J. Com. & Com., Dec. 22, 1992, at
3A.
456 Following Mandela's September 24th speech to the General Assembly, the
United Nations abolished most nonmandatory economic sanctions in October and
removed its long standing oil embargo on December 8, 1993. South Africa: UN lifts
oil embargo, BBC, Dec. 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTNews
File. The oil embargo was enacted in December 1977. Anthony Goodman, United
Nations: U.N. ends oil embargo against South Africa, Reuter Newswire, Dec. 9,
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Once an agreement over constitutional change appeared
imminent, de Klerk and Mandela separately lobbied Western
leaders and the United Nations457 for the abolition of all re-
maining sanctions. 458 Acceptance of a new constitutional for-
mat and a schedule set for democratic elections under an
interim government called the Transitional Executive Council
(TEC) was reached in September 1993.4 59  Congress then
passed the South African Democratic Transition Support Act of
1993460 which President Bill Clinton signed into law in No-
vember 1993. After this law abolished most of the remaining
federal sanctions, 46 1 institutional investors and American col-
leges and universities ended their divestment policies and be-
gan considering investments in an independent South Africa.462
Hence the scope of U.S. sanctions forced the vast majority
of U.S, corporations to divest their entire equity portfolios, thus
substantially diminishing their commercial ties with South Af-
rican business and industries. Additionally, the prolonged
length of U.S. sanctions contributed to the relatively late return
of U.S. corporations to the search for investment opportunities
there.
B. Market Changes in South Africa
The sanctions era certainly changed, if not altogether re-
vamping, the competitive structure of many consumer markets
in South Africa. Several broad features are noteworthy. To be-
gin with, the hyperinflationary economy fueled a process of
business selfabsorption. Following the debt crisis of 1984-
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTNEWS file. All remaining nonman-
datory sanctions, with the exception of the arms embargo, were abolished when
the TEC assumed the reigns of presidential power on December 6, 1993. Econ.
Intelligence Unit, Country Report: South Africa, 9 (1st qtr, 1994).
457 Sweden: Mandela and De KIerk urge Swedish Businessmen to invest in
South Africa, BBC Monitoring Service, Dec. 13, 1993, available in WESTLAW,
INTNEWS Database.
4m Africa South of the Sahara, supra note 24, at 799-800.
459 PL 103149; HR 3225, S 1493.
460 The bill became law on November 23, 1993. President Clinton signs legisla-
tion lifting sanctions against South Africa, BNA Washington Insider, Nov. 26,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNADNEWS File.
461 See College Reverse Divestment Plans, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1993, at 33.
462 See notes and accompanying text, infra.
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1985463 South African citizens and companies took over $5 bil-
lion out of the country in a five year period.464 During that time
South Africa went from its historical position as a net capital
importer to a net capital exporter. 465 In fact the dearth of for-
eign capital created a cycle of declining stock values and local
repurchases, to the point where corporate crossshareholdings
placed more than 80% of all the shares listed on the Johannes-
burg Stock Exchange into the hands of South Africa's five major
conglomerates. 466 Even the parastatals absorbed local assets,
as the government came to own a third of all fixed assets in
South Africa.467
The loss of foreign private finance resulted in constraints
on market diversification and industry development. Local fi-
nance stiffened in response to the government's exchange con-
trols. Companies returned greater portions of their earnings
and profits into maintenance expense in order to halt declines
in their permanent capital accounts. Declining productive out-
puts and negative industry growth also arose from the loss of
technological inputs.468
Lastly, the divestment patterns of the main industrialized
countries have actually leveled some of the market share dis-
parities which previously were dominated by American and Eu-
ropean MNCs. Now corporations from Singapore, Taiwan, and
other countries add to the field of traditional competitors oper-
ating in South Africa.
Current market conditions favor those corporations which
can quickly infuse local companies with finance and technologi-
cal inputs.469  Many industries, especially those involved
463 Millard W. Arnold, Engaging South Africa after Apartheid, 87 Foreign Pol'y
139, at 143 (1992).
464 Lachman & Bercuson, supra note 28, at 32.
465 PreElection Nerves, PostElection Questions, Investors Chronicle, Apr. 1,
1994, available in LEXIS, COMPNY Library, MANEWS File.
466 Market Reports, South Africa Overseas Business Report, July 20, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BUSANL File (hereinafter "Market Reports,
July 20, 1993").
467 Keller, supra note 14.
4 Market Reports, Dec 15, 1993
49 Id.
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higher level manufacturing, also require an influx of manage-
rial expertise. 470
In these circumstances existing business relationships pro-
vide distinct advantages in that changes in management and
plant restructuring can be phased in gradually as opposed to
the confusion of establishing an entirely new set of operations
following a successful merger. However, in divesting all equity
holdings, few American MNCs maintained the types of none-
quity arrangements that would now facilitate an expansion of
local businesses. This pattern contrasts with those formed by
the partial divestitures and subsequent investment by British,
German and Japanese MNCs. Because most of these companies
reduced but did not eliminate their equity holdings during the
sanctions era, they are presumably in a better position to meet
rapid expansion of operations and services.
An obvious competitive difference between American MNCs
and their European competitors relates to the operation of
double taxation treaties. As noted earlier, the tax treaty be-
tween the United States and South Africa terminated in July
1987. Although the Service began informal treaty talks with
their South African counterparts six months before the April
elections,471 official negotiations did not commence until June
1994 and were not completed as this Comment went to publica-
tion. It is certain, however, that the new treaty will not restore
the previous one.472
Unlike the U.S., neither Germany473 nor Great Britain474
abolished their tax treaties with South Africa during the sanc-
470 Treaty negotiations may have started informally in 1992, but protests from
Congressional leaders prevented the Treasury Department from pursuing formal
negotiations. See United States: Rangel urges Treasury to delay tax treaty negotia-
tions with South Africa, 4 Tax Notes Int'l 1310 (June 22, 1992).
471 Rev. Rul. 9263, 92 FED par. 46, at 433.
472 Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Germay and the Repulic of
South Africa for the avoidance of Double taxation with respect to taxes on Income.
473 Schedule Convention between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of South
Africa for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.K.R.S.A., Jan. 1, 1987. The May
1962 agreement remains in effective today. See 93 Tax Notes Int'l 919.
474 Schedule Convention between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of South
Africa for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.K.R.S.A., Jan. 1, 1987. In fact, the
BritishSouth Africa double tax treaty contains a tax sparing measure which treats
as creditable the amount of taxes payable in the host country irrespective of actual
19941 9
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tions era. Thus the favorable foreign tax credit and withholding
taxes rates were available to MNCs within these countries. 475
Additionally, companies operating as a CFC there are excluded
from British CFC legislation.476 In addition to these traditional
sources of foreign investment, South Africa has recently con-
cluded tax treaties with Poland,477 Taiwan,478 and France.479
Hence U.S. companies reinvesting in South Africa face a
number of competitive challenges, due to the length and scope
of U.S. sanctions and subsequent changes in South Africa's do-
mestic markets. The competitiveness of U.S. MNCs seeking
South African investments will also depend on the ability of fi-
nancial managers to harmonize the current investment and tax
regulations in South Africa with U.S. tax law pertaining to in-
terest deductions.
PART III. THE TAX DISADVANTAGE AND COUNTERVAILING
LOCAL REGULATIONS
In examining the investment and tax regulations applica-
ble to new investments in South Africa, Part III integrates the
discussion of the preceding two parts by illustrating how the
new interest expenses rules disadvantage American MNCs in
their competition with British, German and Japanese multina-
tionals for South Africa's emerging markets and investment op-
portunities. Specifically, two features of the current tax system
pose significant obstacles for U.S. MNCs seeking to invest
there.
payment. That is, even if the subsidiary is not taxed in South Africa due to, for
example, a tax holiday, the amount it would have had to pay is credited to the
parent's U.K tax liability.
475 John G. Goldsmith, U.K Inland Revenue releases list of countries excluded
from application of CFC legislation, 7 Tax Notes Int'l 1027, at 2038 (Oct. 25, 1993).
476 Janusz Fiszer, Poland signs tax treaty with South Africa, 7 Tax Notes Int'l
1354 (Nov. 29, 1993).
477 On February 14, 1994, Taiwan and South Africa entered into a double taxa-
tion treaty. More on TaiwanSouth Africa treaty, Int'l Bureau of Fiscal Documenta-
tion, Mar. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, IBFD File.
478 On November 8, 1993, France and South Africa entered into a double taxa-
tion treaty. FranceSouth treaty, Int'l Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, IBFD File.
479 Pierre du Toit, South Africa: Asset Financing, World Tax Rep. Sept. 1993,
available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, WLDTAX File.
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A. South Africa Taxes
South Africa taxes resident nonmining corporations
through the use of residency and source principles and there are
no provisions for group or consolidated tax treatment for affili-
ated corporations. 480 Non-mining corporations are governed by
the Companies Act of 1973, which "regulates the formation, con-
duct of affairs and liquidation of all companies" 48' Local subsidi-
aries are defined as "companies" incorporated in South Africa
which are owned by non-residents. 482 Conversely, a branch is
an "external company"483 and is taxed at the same rate as com-
panies.484 Partnerships are also permitted, although no part-
nership is allowed to have more than 20 partners.4 5 As in the
United States, partnerships are unincorporated businesses
wherein profits immediately accrue to partners.486 Since joint
ventures are not specifically defined in South African tax law,
partnerships are generally the vehicle through which such ven-
tures are formed.487
On July 20, 1993, the South African government passed the
Income Tax Act of 1993 ("ITA 1993")488 which established a
dual corporate tax system. 48 9 ITA 1993 imposes a 40% tax on
declared profits and a 15% "Secondary Tax on Companies
("SCT")"49° on undistributed profits. The latter is "designed to
480 Market Reports, South Africa Overseas Business Report, July 20, 1993,
available in LEXIS, COMPNY Library, BUSOPP File.
481 Deloitte, Touche, Tohmatsu, supra note 95, at 63.
482 PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 24
(Suppl. 1992)(hereinafter "Price Waterhouse, South Africa").
4M Deloitte, Touche Tohmatsu, supra note 95, at 61
484 Id. at 77.
485 Williams & Eskinazi, South Africa, in EFFECTIVE TAX STRATEGIES
FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, at 241 (P. Cooke ed., 1989)(hereinafter "Wil-
liams & Eskinazi").
486 Deloitte, Touche Tohmatsu, supra note 95, at 63.
487 Income Tax Act No. 113 of 1993 (GN 1280, GG 14979, 20 July 1993), as
cited in Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 20, note 64. See also Tax Cuts Offset by Divi-
dend Levy in South Africa, Worldwide Fin. Reg., May 3, 1993, available in LEXIS,
TAX Library, TAXANA, File.
488 Marius van Blerck, South Africa's New Dual Tax System, 8 Tax Notes Int'l
311 (1994)(hereinafter "Blerck").
489 John Turro, Tax reform: South Africa prepares for economic change, 7 Tax
Notes Int'l 728, at 729 (Sept. 20, 1993).
490 Basil Wunsh, South Africa, in DIFFERENCES IN TAX TREATMENT OF
FOREIGN INVESTORS: DOMESTIC SUBSIDIARIES AND DOMESTIC
BRANCHES, 176 (J. Forry, ed., 1984)(hereinafter "Wunsh").
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compel the distribution of a company's profits by way of divi-
dends" 49 1 Withholding taxes on dividends sent by the local
subsidiaries to their foreign shareholders escaped significant re-
vision under ITA 1993, including the exemption of such taxes
for local subsidiaries in which are 50% or more South African
interests total at least 50%.492 Interest income received by or
accrued to a taxpayer from a South African source is taxable.
493
As applied to non-residents, the actual source of interest is de-
termined by where the credit was made available by the credi-
tor to the debtor.
With regard to interest expense, local subsidiaries of for-
eign corporations may deduct interest under Section 11(a) of the
Income Tax Act of 1962 so long as it was 'incurred in the pro-
duction of income.' 494 Although "interest payable by a South
African subsidiary to an overseas parent company or other
lender is deductible,"495 interest paid on loans used to acquire
other companies is not.496 Hence it appears that foreign corpo-
rations which incurred indebtedness in acquiring a South Afri-
can company could not deduct the interest on the purchase
price if the acquisition consisted solely of assets or shares. Still,
the deductibility of interest owed by local subsidiaries to their
overseas companies from inter-company loans is at the discre-
tion of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue under § 11(b) of the
1962 Income Tax Act.497 Often tax treaties specifically covered
interest deductions. For example, both the German and British
tax treaties with South Africa limited the amount of tax im-
posed on interest income sourced in South Africa to 10%. 49s
Likewise, Article IV of the abolished U.S.South African double
tax treaty exempted South African taxes on inter-company
loans that were sourced in the United States.499
491 Coopers & Lybrand, INTERNATIONAL TAX SUMMARIES, 82
(1993)(hereinafter "Coppers & Lybrand").
492 South Africa: Withholding tax, World Tax Rpt, Mar. 1993, available in
LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, TXTP File.
493 Deloitte, Touche Tohmatsu, supra note 95, at 85.
494 Wunsh, supra note 490, at 169.
495 Deloitte, Touche Tohmatsu, supra note 95, at 85.
496 Id.
497 Id. at 169
49 Id. at 169-170.
499 South Africa: Tax on Interes to NonResidents, World Tax Rep., August
1992, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library File.
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However, in June 1992 the Finance ministry announced
that 'all interest in the hands of companies not managed or con-
trolled in South Africa will be completely exempt from tax.'50 0
Interest income paid by CFCs to nonresidents are no longer
subject to withholding taxes, a change that encourages foreign
corporations investing or operating in South Africa to use
onlending in capitalizing or funding the working capital of their
affiliates.
Since interest payments are made in commercial rands, all
foreign loans must first be approved by the Exchange Control
(discussed momentarily).50 1 If approval is granted, the amount
of interest paid to the non-resident corporation is tax deductible
on the company's South African tax liability so long as the loan
is used for the production of taxable income and the interest
rate is line with current local rates.50 2
B. South Africa Currency Exchange
Exchange control involves the regulation of the movement
of assets and activities via domestic and foreign currencies.
Two basic features occupy this discussion: control of all com-
pany lending entering the country and the dual currency ex-
change system.
In August 1985, at the earliest stages of the flight of capital
out of South Africa, the government reintroduced a dual or two-
tier exchange rate for its currency in order to bolster its sagging
balance of payments and avoid bankruptcy.50 3 The rand was
divided into commercial and financial units, with the former
serving as the official exchange rate while all foreign invest-
ment and purchases of securities and other assets by nonresi-
dents are denominated in the latter.50 4 Financial rands are
500 Deloitte, Touche Tohmatsu, supra note 95, at 119.
501 Id. at 20-21.
502 Philip Gawith, SA to begin loan payback next year, Fin. Times, Sept. 28,
1993, at 7. The twotier system was first introduced in March 1968 and repealed in
September 1975. Katherine Munro, Monetary Policy, Commercial Banking and the
Political Imperative, 196585, in BANKING AND BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA,
125 (S. Jones, ed., 1988).
503 South AfricaForeign Economic Trends, Market Reports, Sept. 15, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BUSALA File ("Market Reports, September 15,
1993").
504 Deliotte, Touche, Tohmatsu, supra note 95, at 20.
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held and used by non-residents in South Africa through the ap-
proval of the Exchange Control.50 5
As an emergency measure, the dual currency protected the
government's foreign currency reserves and stemmed price
rises in an otherwise hyperinflationary economy.506 The dis-
count between the financial rand and the commercial rand has
floated over the past nine years from 20% to 40%,57 providing
foreign investors with initial and at times substantial currency
gains at the cost of penalizing future profit repatriation from
affiliated operations.50  However, local affiliates of foreign cor-
porations still pay dividends and interest payments in commer-
cial rands.50 9
The dual currency system has adversely affected South Af-
rica's capital markets. Although the financial rand's discount
rate provides U.S. investors with immediate currency gains,
such gains are subsequently lost once the Rand units are recon-
verted into U.S. dollars, i.e., by remitting earnings to the parent
corporation in U.S. dollars. Exchange rate losses on loans se-
cured in South Africa cut into the local company's profits.510
Despite these difficulties, the South African Reserve Bank is ex-
pected to maintain the dual system to mid1995 or at least until
sustained export growth permits a single currency.5 11
Historically, South African Exchange Control policies have
favored equity based investment in South African subsidiaries
because the "interest payable to the overseas parent company is
deductible" and is taxed only once, whereas dividends are taxed
(income tax on subsidiary when earned and withholding tax
when remitted).5 12 As such the government has closely moni-
tored the level of local borrowing of for both external companies
(i.e. foreign branches) and South African companies in which at
505 Philip Gawith, Survey of South Africa Open for Investment, Fin. Times,
Nov. 18, 1993, at 38.
506 Thomson, supra note 17.
507 Sean Ross, S. African Bank Official Wary of Early Abolition of Currency, J.
Com., July 19, 1994, at 3a.
50 Deloitte, Touche, Tohmatsu, supra note 95, at 119.
509 This has been the experience of a British manufacturer, The Group 600.
510 Tony Hawkins, Survey of South Africa Open for Investment, Fin. Times,
Nov. 18, 1993, at 37; Gawith, supra, note 449, at 38.
511 Wunsh, supra note 490, at 167.
512 Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 491, at 82.
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least 25% of its shares are held by nonresidents.513 All compa-
nies or partnerships so owned are called "affected persons."514
The restriction on the level of local borrowing is limited to a
percentage of its "total effective capital employed,"515 a calcula-
tion based on a ratio of foreign to local equity holdings. Section
3(1)(f) of the exchange regulations provides the following
calculation:516
50% + ((% South African interest)/(% nonresident interest) x 50%)
If for example the foreign equity of a local subsidiaries reaches
75%, the relevant lending limitation equals 66.7%.5 17 For a
joint venture, however, if the South Africa interest is 50 per
cent or more, the venture is permitted to borrow from local lend-
ers up to 100 per cent of total shareholder's equity.518
In November 1992, the Finance Ministry imposed regula-
tions which require most foreign investments to be funded with
foreign loans.5 19 All foreign loans remain denominated in com-
mercial rands, however. 520 Dividends paid by local subsidiaries
which are at least 25% owned or controlled by non-residents
must also be approved by the Exchange Control before
repatriation.521
Overall, these changes encourage foreign corporations to fi-
nance their South African investments by way of offshore fi-
nancing. Since interest payments made by CFCs in South
Africa are now tax free, inter-company lending is likely to in-
crease. Additionally, the November 1992 regulations concern-
ing foreign loans point clearly to this conclusion. For U.S.
513 Id.
514 Among other items, effective capital employed includes 'overdrafts, local
discounting, financial leasing of capital equipment, mortgage bonds and shares
and debentures not subscribed for by equity shareholders." ERNEST & YOUNG,
DOING BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 14 (1990).
515 Wunsh, supra note 490, at 165-66.
516 Deloitte, Touche Tohmatsu, supra note 95, at 23.
517 Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 19.
518 South Africa, Worldwide Financial Regulations, Jan. 31, 1994, available on
WESTLAW
519 Deloitte, Touche Tohmatsu, supra note 95, at 21.
520 Ernest & Young, supra note 514, at 14.
521 C. Shepard, Tax Obstacles and Incentives to Inward Investment in Non-
member countries: The Experience of the United Kingdom, in TAXATION AND IN-
TERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS, 105 (Organisation for Eonomic Cooperation
and Development, comp. 1990).
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MNCs, these regulations may feature prominently in the deci-
sion making process concerning South Africa as an investment
site, especially for manufacturing companies with excess for-
eign tax credits.
It may be argued, then, that the incongruity of U.S. interest
expense rules and South African regulations has until recently
been overshadowed by the continuity of sanctions and political
uncertainties surrounding the transition to majoity rule. Most
American companies operating or investing there since the mid
1980s have been limited to nonequity arrangements, which may
be considered an inadequate means of sustaining market shares
during a time when a influx of foreign direct investment. With
the sanctions removed and foreign investment expected to pour
into the South African economy over the next decade, the in-
compatibility of these sets of regulations now have greater
import.
C. Impacts on the U.S. Corporate Return to South Africa
It is asserted here that the tax treatment of interest ex-
pense within affiliated corporate group not only affects the inci-
dence of double taxation U.S. parents face but their investment
behavior as well. Because tax considerations are a key factor in
the "manner in which [an] investment is financed,"522 U.S.
manufacturing MNCs may discover that the choice of entity is
particularly constrained when discussing South African
investments.
However, the 15% withholding tax is ten percentage over
the statutory definition and when combined with the 40% corpo-
rate rate, South Africa falls into the high tax category.
Secondly, the exchange control regulations are designed to
protect South Africa's financial markets, and thus encourage
foreign investors to in effect begin their own finance. The de-
ductions for acquisition indebtedness are narrowly drawn, com-
plicating further efforts by U.S. MNCs to place debt on the
target when investing there.
Hence U.S. manufacturing MNCs encounters a dilemma in
returning to South Africa, as most U.S. manufacturers MNCs
with excess foreign tax credits desire local borrowing as a
522 Deloitte, Touche, Tohmatsu, supra note 95, at 92.
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means of maximizing their U.S. foreign tax credits. The follow-
ing discussions assume an American manufacturing MNC, re-
ferred to as U.S. Parent, desires a South African affiliate which
will produce active, general limitation income. Four entities are
examined, a noncontrolled subsidiary, CFCs, corporate foreign
joint ventures and joint ventures structured as partnerships,
with foreign tax credit and interest expense apportionments
centering each discussion.
1. Noncontrolled Subsidiaries
Few advantages accompany the choice of a non-controlled
or 10/50 subsidiary. Among them is the ability to deduct vari-
ous expenses charged to it by its parent company, including in-
terest.523 Assuming the majority stake is held by South African
interests, the subsidiary would be able to borrow maximum al-
lowed under the exchange control regulations.
However, in the absence of a favorable tax treaty provisions
that many of their European competitors enjoy, U.S. minority-
owned subsidiaries in South Africa are taxed currently on their
earnings and taxed at the highest withholding tax rates when
dividends are remitted.5 2 4 Then once the U.S. parent receives
the dividend, it must place the accompanying foreign tax credits
in a separate limitation basket. Since the South African corpo-
rate tax rate is five percentage points higher the U.S., the ex-
cess credits are lost forever. Also interest income remitted by a
non-controlled § 902 corporation would be subject to the high
withholding tax limitation basket, wherein only one-third of the
15% South African tax paid on such income would be
creditable. 525
2. CFCs
From a U.S. tax perspective, establishing a non-controlled
10/50 subsidiary in South Africa by way of debt based, asset
acquisitions may represent a logical progression for companies
which are already operating licensing and distributions ar-
rangements there. For example, Coca Cola recently announced
523 Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 491, at 82.
524 I.R.C. § 904(d)(2)(E)(ii).
525 Id.
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the purchase of the local company that had been servicing Co-
caCola bottlers since 1987.526
Similar problems arise with the establishment of a con-
trolled foreign corporation. If a CFC is chosen, an inter-com-
pany loan increases the value of the parent's overseas assets,
thereby placing a larger portion of group interest expense over-
seas. The interest payments are characterized as passive in-
come and under the CFC netting rule the parent's interest
expense in securing the loan is allocated against foreign source
income. In fact it is possible that a U.S. parent corporation
could lose up to a half of interest expense deductions due to ob-
taining CFC status and having high debt to equity ratios within
the affiliated structure.
Although the CFC netting rule directs most U.S. MNCs to
avoid inter-company lending, South African tax law actually fa-
vors such lending as local subsidiaries are permitted to deduct
interest paid on loans from related party creditors so long as the
loan proceeds are used to produce income. 527 Additionally, in-
terest payments made to U.S parent are exempt from under the
new regulations.
3. Corporate Joint Ventures
A better alternative is perhaps to establish a foreign joint
venture as a CFC. That is, U.S. MNCs could structure the own-
ership requires such that the CFC rules apply to it. This would
enable the US Parent to defer the venture's earnings (other
than those of subpart F). Also, the dividends received from the
venture would be handled by subpart F and are not subject to a
separate foreign tax credit limitation. Hence the foreign source
income that is taxed at 40% will not result in a loss of 5% of the
foreign taxes paid, but rather creates a 5% excess credits which
may be soaked up by other lowtaxed foreign source income
placed in the active source residual limitation basket.
Secondly, CFC status enables the U.S. parent to character-
ize the interest paid to the parent under the look through rules
of § 904(d) and Reg. 1.9045. Here again passive income is
avoided, becoming instead general source income. The same
526 Deloitte, Touche, Tohrnatsu, supra note 95, at 119.
527 ANC Begins Talks With Germany on Protecting Investors in Africa, J. Com.,
at 10A.
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benefits for onlending accrue as well. However, the presump-
tion here is that the U.S. manufacturers needs to reduce its ex-
cess foreign tax credits.
4. Joint Ventures as Partnerships
Starved of technology inflows for almost a decade, many
South African businesses are presently forming joint ventures
with foreign corporations as a means of securing a steady
source of inputs. Joint ventures appear to be particularly bene-
ficial for those U.S. manufacturers which are investing in South
Africa for the first time and which need local expertise in mar-
keting their products. Indeed, the ANC government sees joint
ventures as key economic stimulants and actively promotes
their use.528 These policy pronouncements have only height-
ened the race among foreign corporations for attractive, profita-
ble "local partners, especially among South Africa's hundreds of
black entrepreneurs."529
The race in fact began a few years ago. In fact, Heinz, one
of the few U.S. MNCs that began searching for South African
companies in the early 1990s, is expected to announce a joint
venture with a South African by 1995 and use the venture as
'springboard' to regional markets. During 1993, several sub-
stantial joint ventures were announced from a variety of indus-
tries, including in ferroalloys mining,530  electronics
manufacturing,5 31 pharmaceuticals53 2 and prossessed foods.533
528 Loeb, supra note 27, at 18.
529 Nippon Renko, the leading supplier of ferroalloys in Japan, negotiated a
joint venture arrangement with South Africa's largest ferrochrome producer,
Samancor. If completed, the arrangement will enable Japan to maintain its pre-
ponderant position in the stainless steel industries. Country report: South Africa,
Economist Intelligence Unit, No. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
INTNEWS File.
530 Likewise, a South Korean electronics manufacturer Daewoo formed a joint
venture with Anglo-American. Findlay & Davis, supra note 445, at 58.
531 For example, the leading South African pharmaceuticals company formed a
joint venture with a Swedish firm. Astra i samagt bolag i Sydafrka, Dagnes Indus-
tri, Sept. 22, 1993, at 12. Another corporation, Pharmacia, established a similar
arrangement in December 1993, Pharmacia to set up S. Africa unit., Fin. Times,
Dec. 23, 1993, at 18.
532 In October 1993 Pillsbury established a 5050 joint venture. Findlay & Da-
vis, supra note 445, at 58.
533 Rory Channing, Pepsi, Hailing a New Generation, Says It's Returning to
South Africa, J. Corn & Com. , June 7, 1994, at 3A.
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U.S. MNCs have made surge of late, with Pepsi 534 announcing
a joint venture this past summer.
As in the choice of subsidiary operations, the U.S. corporate
venturer must be mindful of the host country's tax treatment of
the partnership. In South Africa, joint ventures are invariably
structured as partnerships.535 The key advantage of operating
a 50/50 joint venture in South Africa is that the venture is able
to borrow from local sources up to 100 per cent of total share-
holder's equity in the venture. 536
Because the partnership is a pass through entity, the U.S.
corporate partner may directly allocate its share of the partner-
ship's interest expense to U.S source income.537 If the U.S. par-
ent owns at least 10% of a foreign corporate joint venture and
receives repatriated profits from the venture, it may credit for-
eign income taxes paid by the venture. 538
Under § 901 deemed foreign tax credits, the U.S. corporate
partner is permitted to claim a distributive share of the joint
venture's paid foreign taxes.539
Because the U.S. parent owns at least 10% of the partner-
ship interest, its proportionate share of JVP's interest expense
is added to the group's interest expense and the U.S. parent's
foreign asset base 'includes the gross value of its share of JVP
assets, not the value of its equity in JVP.540 'the benefit for a
parent with excess credits is that a potion of its JVP interest
expense reduces South African taxes and reduces US source in-
come for U.S. tax purpose.
Nevertheless a few nontax obstacles may impede the use of
this entity choice. In terms of canvassing for local partners, the
staggered removal of sanctions in effect delayed the entry of
U.S. MNCs and thus many South African companies willing to
534 Deloitte, Touche, Tohmatsu, supra note 95, at 63.
535 Eisenberg,supra note 51, at 19.
536 Treas. Reg. 1.8619T(e)(7)(i).
537 Davis & Lainoff, supra note 105.
538 I.R.C. § 702(a)(6); Treas. Reg. 1.7021(a)(6).
539 Parnes, supra note 111, at 16; Treas. Reg. § 1.8619T(e)(2).
540 Just as several American corporations tried to demonstrate their commit-
ment to social reforms by establishing education and training programs, trust
funds, and other services for black South Africans during the height of the divest-
ment movement, so too may the same companies now glean favorable 'corporate
responsibility' marks by investing in the future of a majorityruled South Africa.
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enter into joint venture may have already made committed with
other MNCs. U.S. corporations may also face disadvantages in
negotiating joint ventures in South Africa, as the local part may
be unwilling to negotiate a structure in which the U.S. parent
can achieve partnership status for the joint venture. Although
having the venture treated as a partnership for U.S. tax pur-
poses, the requirements necessary to achieve such status may
require the South Africa counterpart to make concessions it
otherwise does not consider in negotiating a venture with other
foreign corporations. For example, in order for the joint venture
to obtain partnership status, the South African venturer must
agree to a specific distributions of assets. Added to these factors
are social pressures for specific management features within
the joint venture, 541 features that European and Asian corpora-
tion are unlikely to insist on in negotiating with local South Af-
rican companies.
On balance, however, joint ventures appear to be offer the
best avenue for most American corporations wishing to return
to the South African marketplace.
To begin with, no deferral is possible and the U.S. parent
must include currently the earnings of the venture. Since
South Africa imposes a rate five percentage points higher than
35% all of the earnings will be sheltered by the foreign tax
credit,542 the loss of deferral provisions as a consequence of op-
erating as a partnership poses no hardship on MNCs which are
in a position of excess credits.
Secondly, JVP will be, under South African law, able to bor-
row up to 100% of its foreign assets because the South African
equity interest equals 50%. Two favorable financing options are
then available under this entity. If JVP borrows from a third-
party lender, and the U.S. Parent holds more than 10% of JVP,
US Parent must apportion its share of JVP's interest expense to
all of its assets including the pro rata share of JVP's assets. 543
Just as a portion of domestic third-party loans attaches to for-
eign source income, so must a portion of foreign third-party
loans from a qualified partnership interest proportionately at-
tach to domesticsource income. This rule departs from the
541 Davis & Lainoff, supra note 105.
542 Treas. Reg. § 1.8619T(f).
54 I.R.C. §§ 702(a),(b); 901(b)(5).
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water's edge fungibility concept which as noted excludes the in-
terest expense of nonU.S. entities. Here however the partner-
ship is a passthrough entity and thus the interest expense
apportionment to domestic source income affords at least a
moderate tax benefit to U.S. Parent.
Thirdly, under § 901 deemed credit rules, US Parent is con-
sidered to have incurred a proportionate share of JVP's foreign
taxes.544 Having to meet a 10% threshold for foreign tax credit
purposes, U.S. Parent looks through the partnership to deter-
mine which § 904 basket covers its share of partnership in-
come.5 45 This requires assessment of whether any of the
following apply:546 the high tax kickout exception 547 high with-
holding tax interest 548
CONCLUSIONS
The relative incompatibility between the U.S. interest ex-
pense rules and South Africa regulations of foreign investments
represents a difficult dilemma for U.S. manufacturing MNCs in-
terested in tapping into South Africa's expanding markets.
This dilemma lies in part from the new scheme of interest ex-
pense allocation among related corporations. Now U.S. parents
should place as much of the interest expense associated with
international investments unto their foreign affiliates.
However, South African currency regulations and tax laws
encourage foreign companies to finance their own activities
there. These regulatory features compound market-borne dis-
advantages that have arose from the scope and duration of the
federal sanctions and current market conditions.
Although the corporate return to South Africa unfolds
under truly unique circumstances, the incongruity of the U.S.
tax law with the local regulatory environment in South Africa
should not be construed as an anomalous situation. For it is the
inflexibility of the new interest expense that prevent U.S.
5" Treas. Reg. § 1.9045(hX1).
545 Davis & Lainoff, supra note 105.
546 I.R.C. § 904(dX2XA)(iii)
547 I.R.C. § 904(d)(1XB); see note 5 and accompanying text, supra.
50 That American multinational corporations may now experience difficulty in
financing their South Africa businesses by no means overshadows the remarkable
political metamorphosis South Africa has undergone in searching for ways to redi-
rect its tragic and embittered history towards a more egalitarian future.
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MNCs from obtaining a full deduction on general business in-
terest expense. As a result, the type of foreign tax credit bene-
fits that be procured in a given set of financing structure stands
as a central feature of tax planning. When regulations or poli-
cies in the host country conflict with the preferred structures,
additional tax costs enter into the decisional calculus. In that
respect, the 'global tax disadvantage' these rules place on U.S.
MNCs looms larger than what might have been anticipated
when TRA 1986 was first contemplated.
Scott E. Siverson
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